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ABSTRACT 
 
Increasing the effectiveness of higher education institutions has become 
increasingly important for states in recent decades. During this time, a wide range of 
performance-based higher education funding initiatives has emerged as a means to 
improve outcomes in higher education. However, although performance-based funding 
initiatives continue to take shape in a number of states, only a few studies have evaluated 
the effectiveness of these policies over time. The purpose of this study is to examine the 
effectiveness of performance funding implementation in United States (U.S.) public four-
year institutions, by evaluating the relationship between funding amount and program 
duration with outcomes represented by completion rates and retention rates.  
This study employs hierarchical linear regression (HLM) methods to evaluate 
2,452 four-year public institutions in 50 states from 2004 to 2010, using publicly 
available data obtained from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System 
(IPEDS) longitudinal Delta Cost Project Database. Additional institution-level control 
variables are also included from IPEDS data, and state-level control variables are 
incorporated from the National Conference of State Legislatures [NCSL] (2013), Bureau 
of Labor Statistics [BLS] (2013) and Bureau of Economic Analysis [BEA] (2013) 
datasets.  
The results of this study’s analyses reveal that neither funding amount nor 
duration was meaningfully associated with completion rate or retention rate from 2004 to 
2010. The institution-level variable faculty-student ratio was found to have a moderately 
significant association with completion rate, however. An examination of variance at 
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each level of the model showed that the addition of institution-level factors accounted for 
the greatest proportion of variance reduction.  
This study recommends that further research should be conducted in order to 
evaluate individual state-level funding models more thoroughly. In addition, state higher 
education boards and institutional administrators should clarify funding objectives and 
outcomes measures in order to improve existing models and enhance the alignment 
between funding formulae and institutional mission. It is also recommended that states 
should be willing to revise or cease performance-based funding policies when research 
reveals implementation to be ineffective. Furthermore, the study recommends that 
institutional administrators, faculty, and staff give greater attention to the implementation 
and communication of performance funding policies at the institutional level. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Carnegie Classification: Carnegie Foundation categorization of United States higher 
education colleges and universities for research purposes based on institutional functions 
and characteristics. 
 
Completion Rate: The ratio of “degrees, certificates, diplomas or other formal awards 
granted by an institution in a year” (National Center for Education Statistics [NCES] 
2013b), divided by the full-time equivalent (FTE) count for the year. Institutions are 
required to report completions of students who complete a degree within 150 percent of 
the normal completion time, including three years for a two-year degree, and six years for 
a four-year degree (2013b). Students who transfer and complete a degree at another 
institution are not included in this calculation (2013b).  
 
Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Enrollment: The sum of full-time enrollment plus a 
calculated portion of part-time enrollment. This calculation is based on factors specific to 
the “control and level of institution and level of student” (NCES 2013b). These ratios are 
outlined in Table 3. 
 
Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA): Application used by the U.S. 
Department of Education to determine eligibility for federal Pell grant, Work-Study, and 
federal student loans. 
 
Funding Formula: Method of calculation established for the allocation of state funding at 
public higher education institutions.  
 
Higher Education Act of 1965: Federal legislation enacted for the purpose of 
strengthening “the educational resources of our colleges and universities and to provide 
financial assistance for students in postsecondary and higher education” (P. L. 89-329).  
 
Higher Education Price Index (HEPI): Inflation index developed for the purpose of 
tracking “the main cost drivers in higher education” (Commonfund Institute 2013). This 
index “measures the average relative level of prices in a fixed basket of goods and 
services purchased by colleges and universities throughout the year” (2013). 
 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS): A system of surveys 
conducted by the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) collecting information 
on “enrollments, program completions, graduation rates, faculty and staff, finances, 
institutional prices, and financial aid” (NCES 2013c).  
 
Net Tuition Revenue: Total payments collected by an institution from students less 
institutional grant aid (NCES 2013b). 
 
Pell Grant: Need-based federal undergraduate student aid. Funds are distributed based on 
results of the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). 
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Performance Indicator: Quantifiable outcomes factor used to measure progress toward 
institutional objectives. 
 
Performance-Based Funding: State-level higher education funding model in which at 
least a portion of state funding for a given year is allocated based on performance 
indicator outcomes from the prior year. 
 
Private Institution: A college or university under the authority of an independent 
governing board rather than state higher education board or council. Private institutions 
do not receive funding for operations or salaries from state allocations, but funding 
instead comes from private sources including donors, endowment investments, tuition 
and fees, and other sources. However, private institutions can receive federal and state 
grants, and students at private institutions can also receive federal and state financial aid. 
 
Public Institution: A college or university under the authority of a state higher education 
governing board. Public institutions receive funding for operations and salaries from state 
allocations. 
 
Retention Rate: The percentage of full-time equivalent (FTE) students enrolled at an 
institution during a given fall term who re-enrolled the following fall term. 
 
Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT): College admission test of mathematics, reading, and 
writing ability administered by The College Board. 
 
Title IV: Section of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (P. L. 89-329) that established 
programs to increase student assistance including the Federal Work-Study Program, Pell 
Grants, and student loan programs.  
 
Unemployment Rate: Monthly calculation established by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
defined as the percentage of the total U.S. labor force age 16 or older who “do not have a 
job, have actively looked for work in the prior 4 weeks, and are currently available for 
work” (Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS] 2013). 
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Chapter I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Evaluating the cost and effectiveness of systems of higher education in the United 
States has proven to be a critical, yet elusive, goal for states throughout the decades. As 
the cost of delivering public higher education continues to increase (National Center for 
Public Policy and Higher Education [NCPPHE] 2008, 8-9), states have struggled to 
provide adequate funding while also achieving the program goals that governing boards 
and state administrators identify as most important. Traditionally, most states have based 
higher education funding models on enrollment levels (Adleman and Carey 2008, 13). 
However, state-level policies built upon performance-based funding have gained 
popularity in recent years as potential solutions for funding public universities more 
effectively while improving outcomes (13). At its root, performance funding seeks to 
"strengthen the linkage between funding and results” (Robinson 2007, 1) by basing 
funding levels for a given budget year on the outcomes of the previous year (2). One 
method for creating these linkages at the university level is through the establishment of 
performance funding formulae, which specify the relative weights of institution-specific 
factors guiding the distribution of state-level funds for a given year (Burke and 
Associates 2002, 27; 204). Although performance-based funding policies continue to be 
promoted and expanded in many states, a full understanding of their significance for 
institutional outcomes has thus far been lacking.  
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 By implementing policy-level funding initiatives in order to drive improvements 
in higher education outcomes, states potentially gain the ability to adjust funding 
strategically to serve the political purpose of control.  State funding has historically been 
tied directly to enrollment levels (Adleman and Carey 2008, 13), and enrollment-based 
funding policies have served as an important lever used to expand enrollment for many 
years. However, this study will examine ways in which performance-based funding is 
associated with outcomes indicators that go well beyond enrollment. In this way, state 
level higher education boards potentially have a much more direct means of control over 
public institution, and for this reason the economic and political assumptions underlying 
policy-level control of the links between funding and outcomes become critically 
important. For this reason, the goal of this study is to examine and test statistically the 
assumptions underlying the linkages between performance funding and outcomes, and to 
draw appropriate conclusions based on the outcomes of this analysis.  
This analysis will draw upon a single-state panel data study conducted by this 
researcher in 2013 that evaluated Tennessee’s longitudinal performance funding data 
between the years 2004 and 2010 (Woodward 2013). That analysis found a statistically 
significant positive relationship between both state and federal appropriations and 
completion rates in Tennessee, as well as a statistically significant negative relationship 
between tuition revenue and completion rate (2013, 28). This study will seek to expand 
this preliminary analysis in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the 
behavior of amount and duration of performance-funding implementation across 50 
states, using a much wider range of factors that will be outlined below.   
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Conceptually, this study will be driven by the overarching question of 
effectiveness. In light of higher education’s shifting financial landscape, states have acted 
out of necessity by seeking alternative funding models. However, it is critical to ask 
whether performance-based funding does in fact offer a means to enhance the connection 
between funding and outcomes, while still preserving the alignment of these outcomes 
with institutional and state missions. Evaluating this improvement will be accomplished 
by assessing the changes in state-level outcomes indicators during the time period under 
analysis. These specific measures will be discussed further in Chapter 3. 
This study’s conceptual framework will be built around the goal of understanding 
the inherently iterative cycle of higher education financial decision-making. Through the 
careful selection of funding factors and control variables, this study will employ 
quantitative analysis as a means to evaluate more fully the historic relationship between 
funding and outcomes. As a review of the literature in Chapter 2 will illustrate, 
understanding this relationship will offer potentially significant benefits for both 
institutions and states. 
Statement of the Problem 
 
 Although performance-based funding policies have been implemented throughout 
the years using a wide range of models, the primary issue addressed by this study is that a 
comprehensive understanding of the impact and significance of their relationship to 
outcome indicators is still lacking. This lack of understanding leads to policy ambiguity 
with regard to design and implementation, and produces potential inefficiencies in the 
financial operations of public universities. In fact, as Rabovsky (2012) notes from 
Gilmour and Lewis (2006) and Moynihan (2008), without a fundamental understanding 
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of the relationship between higher education funding and outcomes, it is often not even 
clear “whether poor performance should be met with reduced or increased funding” 
(Rabovsky 2012, 676). There is clearly an acute gap in higher education policy research, 
and its implications are potentially critical.   
Purpose of the Study 
 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the underlying relationship between 
performance funding and outcomes indicators in public higher education over a seven-
year period, using fixed effects and hierarchical linear methods. In this way, this study 
seeks to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of state-level higher 
education funding, and to offer clear and practical results that are applicable for state-
level policy development and higher education administration. 
Research Questions 
 
 This study will address the problems outlined above by examining the following 
research questions:  
1. Is the amount of state-level performance funding associated with retention rate as an 
institutional outcome in four-year public universities in the U.S. over time?  
2. Is the duration of state-level performance funding associated with retention rate as an 
institutional outcome in four-year public universities in the U.S. over time?  
3. Is the amount of state-level performance funding associated with completion rate as an 
institutional outcome in four-year public universities in the U.S. over time?  
4. Is the duration of state-level performance funding associated with completion rate as 
an institutional outcome in four-year public universities in the U.S. over time?  
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These research questions will be addressed specifically through quantitative 
analyses of Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) longitudinal data 
from 2004 to 2010, compiled as part of the National Center for Education Statistics 
IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database (National Center for Education Statistics [NCES], 
2013a). The research hypotheses for this study will be presented in Chapter 3. 
Summary of Methodology 
 
This section provides an overview of the methodological framework that will be 
used to address the research questions presented above. The independent, dependent, and 
control variables are presented here in introductory form only. Chapter 3 will present the 
selection of variables and determination of analytic strategy in greater detail. This 
quantitative analysis will employ both fixed effects and hierarchical linear regression 
(HLM) methods to evaluate a 50-state panel dataset representing public bachelors, 
masters, and research institutions between the years 2004 and 2010. This study will test 
correlation, not causation. The source for the panel data is the publicly available 
longitudinal “IPEDS Analytics: Delta Cost Project Database,” developed by the 
American Institutes for Research through the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES 2013a).  
The independent, dependent, and control variables used in this study are outlined 
in Table 6 in Appendix A, and the data sources for these variables will be described in 
further detail in Chapter 3. The two dependent variables examined in this study are 
student retention rate (Retention) and completion rate (Completion), two of the most 
commonly used performance indicators among states that have implemented performance 
funding policies (Shin and Milton 2004, 4). The independent variables examined in this 
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study are performance-based funding amount measured in HEPI-scaled 2010 dollars per 
year (Amount), and program duration (Duration) measured in the number of consecutive 
years each state policy has been in effect. Because the outcomes indicators for a given 
fiscal year are based on funding levels appropriated in the prior year, the independent 
variable Amount will be lagged by one year. The selection of Amount and Duration as 
independent variables will allow for the creation of comparison groups between the states 
that implement performance-based funding in a given year, versus those that do not (that 
is, Amount = 0 in years with no performance funding). This model will also allow for 
states that have implemented performance funding in some years, but which might have 
decreased or discontinued the funding program in other years.  
In addition to these independent variables, a range of institution- and state-level 
control variables will be added to the panel data. State-level data are drawn from sources 
including the National Conference of State Legislatures [NCSL] (2013), Bureau of Labor 
Statistics [BLS] (2013), and Bureau of Economic Analysis [BEA] (2013) datasets. These 
state-level variables include state unemployment rate (Unemployment), average personal 
income (Income), and per-capita tax revenue by state (Tax). Institution-level control 
variables included in this study are derived from the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database 
(NCES 2013a). Institution-level variables include average Pell Grant per FTE student 
(Pell); Carnegie Classification of the institution (Carnegie_Bachelors, 
Carnegie_Masters, and Carnegie_Research); SAT I Math scores at the 75th percentile 
(SATMATH75), in-state tuition and fees per FTE student (Tuition), average number of 
full-time instructional faculty per FTE student (Faculty), and the percentage minority 
enrollment (Minority).  
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Limitations of the Study 
 
 It is important to clarify several limitations with regard to the design and scope of 
this study. First, data evaluated in this study will be limited to public non-profit 
institutions and will exclude community colleges, technical colleges, and for-profit 
institutions. This delimitation is operationalized by the use of Carnegie Classifications 15 
through 23 in the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database. While state and local performance 
funding policies certainly impact community and technical college systems, the 
completion and retention rate indicators used in this study are those most frequently 
demonstrated in the literature to be used by four-year universities. Because community 
colleges and technical college systems frequently base outcomes measures on alternative 
indicators such as transfer rates and certifications (Zarkesh and Beas 2004, 70), their 
academic missions are measured in significantly different ways. For this reason, 
Completion and Retention would not be the most appropriate outcomes indicators for 
these categories of institutions.  
From a policy perspective, states have approached the issue of mission 
differentiation for four-year public universities in a variety of ways (Bastedo and 
Gumport 2003, 342-343; Dougherty and Reddy 2013, 60-61). Institutional funding 
formulae often reflect the inclusion of specific state-level goals that are codified by 
funding percentage (Burke and Associates 2002, 15-17). While an evaluation of mission 
differentiation in state-level higher education funding policy is beyond the scope of this 
study, it will be important to incorporate aspects of measurement indicating institutional 
mission.  
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As an example of institutions whose performance-based funding formulae reflect 
mission-specific factor selections, Table 1 displays the formulae established by the state 
of Tennessee for the 2010-2011 fiscal year for the University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
(UTK) and Austin Peay State University.  UTK is categorized as a “Research University” 
with Carnegie Classification 15, and in 2010 the university had a full-time equivalent 
(FTE) enrollment of 24,219 students (THEC 2013a). Austin Peay State University is 
categorized as Carnegie Classification 19, “Master’s Colleges and Universities,” and in 
2010 the university had an FTE enrollment of 8,418 students (NCES 2013a). The funding 
weights displayed here are used by the Tennessee Higher Education Commission to 
differentiate funding based on mission-based differences within the state university 
system (THEC 2011): 
Table 1: Selected Funding Weights for Two Tennessee Universities 
 Funding Weight Percentage 
Factors in Funding 
Formulae 
University of Tennessee, 
Knoxville (UTK) 
Austin Peay State 
University (APSU) 
Bachelors and Associates 15% 25% 
Doctoral / Law Degrees 10% 0% 
Research and Service 15% 10% 
Six-Year Graduation Rate 20% 10% 
Note. Adapted from Tennessee Higher Education Commission [THEC]. (2011). “Outcomes Based Formula 
Narrative”. Retrieved from http://www.state.tn.us/thec/Divisions/Fiscal/funding_formula/1-Outcomes 
Based Formula Narrative - for website.pdf. 
 
While the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database offers a rich collection of funding 
and performance data, the longitudinal scope of the data is limited by the reporting 
practices of each individual institution over time. Although some IPEDS data were 
reported by institutions as early as 1987 (NCES 2013a), several variables from the dataset 
that are used in this study were not reported by institutions prior to 2003. Because of this, 
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the present study will limit data to the years 2004 to 2010, with the addition of 2003 
variable data used for the creation of lagged variables as noted above. As additional years 
of performance data become available, subsequent studies will be able to evaluate the 
effects of state-level funding policies more fully.   
 This study incorporates a number of state-level control variables drawn from a 
range of data sources in addition to the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project, including the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. While the addition of data from these sources provides a relatively broad range 
of additional socioeconomic data for the study’s controls, variable selection is limited by 
the availability of these auxiliary datasets.  
In addition, because some states have only recently adopted performance-based 
funding policies (NCSL 2013), limited meaningful data are available for the independent 
variable Duration in the years following program implementation. Chapter 3 will discuss 
the construction of the variable Duration in further detail, and it will outline the 
implications of time-related limitations associated with data availability. As noted above, 
as performance-based funding implementation generates additional years of data, there 
will be an improved opportunity to evaluate the presence and significance of correlations 
between funding and outcomes in those states. 
Significance of the Study 
 
The story of performance-based higher education funding in the United States has 
been one of the emerging accountability of institutional responsibility, combined with the 
ever-increasing political and economic pressures for increased efficiency at the state 
level. Multiple economic downturns faced by most states since the 1990s have 
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engendered a sense of increased urgency among higher education governing boards and 
state legislatures (Burke and Associates 2002, 6), particularly in light of ever-increasing 
tuition levels in many university systems. As Burke and Associates note, “[c]riticism of 
public higher education rises during recessions and recedes with recovery” (7).  
As Chapter 2 will explore further, the forces giving rise to performance-based 
funding initiatives are not rooted merely in economic pressures, but they often represent 
the convergence of academic, economic, and political forces (Kingdon 1995, 90). For this 
reason, this study will incorporate a range of variables addressing all three areas. For 
many states, the passage of funding policies has been closely tied to the political 
popularity of university accountability (Zumeta 1998, 6-7); however, evidence-based 
systems of analysis and feedback for these programs have been sorely lacking.  
As new waves of performance-based funding initiatives continue to take shape in 
many states (National Conference of State Legislatures [NCSL] 2013), the need for 
research grows ever more urgent. In order to address this need, this study will offer 
several potentially significant benefits in the field of higher education policy research. 
Long-term analysis of the relationship between funding and outcomes can offer valuable 
insights for researchers, policy makers, university leaders, and public administrators who 
seek to improve upon existing state-level funding policy or develop new initiatives. The 
potential applications are particularly significant from the political standpoint: public 
budgeting is an inherently political process (Rubin 2009, 2), and Burke and Associates 
(2002) rightly note that in many cases the political and economic arguments surrounding 
higher education budgeting have “generated more heat than light” (Burke and Associates 
2002, 265). Only in relatively recent years have performance models that can account for 
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differentiating factors such as institutional mission (2-3) replaced earlier implementations 
of performance budgeting described by Miao (2012) as an “initial wave of ineffective 
models” (2). This study will potentially provide a better understanding of the higher 
education funding landscape for legislators, and the results can lead to progress in 
crafting more effective long-term budgetary policy at the state level. 
Furthermore, this study will employ hierarchical linear regression (HLM) analysis 
to evaluate the potential significance of relationships at institutional and state levels in the 
dataset. In this way, insight can potentially be gained into the nature of both institution- 
and state-level relationships among variable levels. As Chapter 2 will show, while 
multilevel analysis has become a commonly used tool in higher education research in 
recent years (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, xxiii), only a few major studies have employed 
this methodology in the evaluation of performance-based funding policies in higher 
education. Because funding policies require both effective designs at the state level as 
well as effective implementation at the institutional level, multilevel analysis can offer 
valuable insights into the relative effectiveness of each component of the funding 
process. In this way, this study can offer significant contributions to the field of state-
level higher education funding policy.  
Burke and Associates (2002) point out that beginning in the 1980s, a number of 
studies revealed major flaws in the identification of student outcomes in higher 
education, as well as in the ability to measure progress toward those goals  (2-5). Even 
after assessment became the subject of greater focus throughout the 1980s and beyond (4-
5), Burke and Associates have observed that institutions have often failed to address 
underlying issues of accountability (Burke and Associates 2002, 5). This pattern of 
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failure has produced what Harnisch (2011) describes as “a mixed history of success and 
instability” (2). By contributing to a greater understanding of the relationship between 
funding and outcomes, this study can provide university governing boards and 
institutional administrators with the tools to administer more effective institutional 
budgets with a greater capacity to achieve institutional goals. In this way, the study will 
also serve to bring added consistency and confidence to the planning process for 
institutional decision makers. 
Summary of Chapters 
 
 Chapter 2 will provide a review of the literature addressing performance funding 
in higher education, and its role in the context of U.S. higher education funding policy. A 
brief review of the historical scope of performance funding literature will first be 
examined, including early programs in Tennessee beginning in the 1970s. Next, studies 
will be outlined that address policies involving the perspective of multiple states, 
particularly in light of changing state and federal grant policies throughout the 1980s and 
beyond. Following this review of the historical context, Chapter 2 will outline primary 
studies in the research literature and their implications for issues including the political 
forces driving performance funding; challenges to performance funding policy; the 
research on performance indicators, including reporting and implementation; evaluations 
of overall effectiveness in the literature; and gaps in the literature and the present state of 
interpretation. Finally, the chapter will outline the role of the research questions of this 
study within the status of current research. Within this context, the conceptual framework 
of the study will be presented in order to set the stage for the analytic strategy presented 
in Chapter 3. 
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 Chapter 3 will present a detailed outline of the study’s research design and 
methodology, and it will also convey the specific measures and procedures that will be 
used to evaluate the null and alternative research hypotheses. This chapter will first 
present the specific measures obtained through the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database 
and other data sources comprising the study’s panel dataset. The validity of these data 
sources will be outlined (Rudestam and Newton 2007, 95), and the relevance and 
procedures for the treatment of the specific variables used in this study will then be 
detailed. The research hypotheses will be tested using both pooled OLS and HLM 
methods of analyses, and the procedural steps will be presented in detail. The outcomes 
of these tests will be summarized in preparation for a full analysis of results in Chapter 4, 
and for interpretation in Chapter 5.  
Chapter 4 will present the results of the analytical tests and procedures outlined in 
Chapter 3. First, descriptive statistics for the variables of interest will be presented along 
with relevant characteristics of the dataset. The adequacy of each test will be evaluated 
with regard to central statistical assumptions (Rudestam and Newton 2007, 158), and 
findings will then be presented for each test. Next, a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) 
model will be evaluated for each dependent variable. The results of hierarchical linear 
analysis of the unconditional model for each dependent variable will be presented along 
with an evaluation of the Intraclass Correlation (ICC) statistic, in order to determine 
whether HLM analysis is appropriate for the model. Based on the results of this 
evaluation, the full HLM models for Completion and Retention will be evaluated. In 
addition, the proportions of variance distribution at each level of analysis will be 
interpreted based on the comparison of random effects components from the 
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unconditional and full models (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, 149-152). Substantive 
conclusions will be based on the results of the full HLM model, and these findings will 
be used to evaluate the null and alternative research presented in Chapter 3. 
Using the test results presented above, Chapter 5 will interpret the research 
findings and evaluate potential significance within the context of the research literature 
(Rudestam and Newton 2007, 195). Because this study’s conceptual framework centers 
on the overarching question of evaluating effectiveness in higher education performance 
funding, Chapter 5 will interpret the meaning of the study’s findings within the context of 
this framework. In addition, any limitations with regard to the scope and applicability of 
the results will be considered, particularly in light of alternative findings and 
methodological approaches identified in the literature (196-197). Based on the context of 
the primary trends in current and emerging research presented in Chapter 2, the study’s 
contributions to the field of higher education research will be considered, and directions 
for further research will be discussed. 
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Chapter II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
While performance-based initiatives in the public and private sectors have been 
evaluated to a substantial degree in budgetary and economic literature, relatively few 
studies have evaluated performance-based funding policies using multi-state data. 
Although a few studies have included a relatively wide range of performance indicators, 
substantive analysis of the long-term impact of higher education performance funding 
remains lacking. This review will explore the primary insights surrounding the role of 
public policy in higher education budgeting found in the literature, as well as the effect 
this can have on budgetary decisions based on current practices in data analysis.  
This review will be presented in several sections, beginning with a brief historical 
review of emerging literature since the early 1980s. This historical perspective will offer 
insight into the early growth in research around state-level performance funding policy 
adoption, and it will provide context for the conceptual framework of the study. Second, 
the use of performance indicators in the research literature will be outlined, along with 
the methodological approaches of studies that examine longitudinal data, including those 
employing multilevel analysis. This will provide background for the selection of the 
indicators examined in this study. Following this, the literature addressing the political 
impact of policy on higher education budgeting will be considered. Finally, critiques and 
limitations of performance funding policy implementation and research will be 
summarized. 
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The Historical Context 
 
Early state-level studies conducted from the 1980s onward offer an interesting 
window into the growth of performance-based research. Tennessee’s pilot performance-
based system in the late 1970s provided one of the first opportunities to examine the 
relationship between performance funding and outcomes. In 1980, Richard Dumont 
published a case study examining the impact of Tennessee’s state funding policy at 
Tennessee Technological University. Dumont’s analysis identified several primary 
motivations for the Tennessee project, including “escalating costs,” “enrollment decline,” 
and “waning public confidence” (Dumont 1980, 405). Dumont’s evaluation also included 
an interesting observation regarding the particular understanding of performance for the 
stakeholders in Tennessee’s emerging funding policy. Dumont noted that if performance 
simply means “the evaluation of achievement against some predetermined standard or 
criterion” (412), then there is the potential for performance funding to become punitive in 
nature, especially when program administration, data collection, and other components of 
the program are not optimal (412). Instead, Dumont observed that Tennessee at that time 
preferred an understanding of performance as a contractual relationship (412-413). By 
this he emphasized an incentive-based aspect of performance, in which academic 
freedom can be maximized while still addressing the program indicators that are 
preferred by the state (413). Furthermore, Dumont observed that focusing on incentives 
as rewards for performance maximizes the ability to “provide public evidence on 
performance” (413).  
In 1982, E. Grady Bogue and Wayne Brown outlined their own involvement in 
developing the Tennessee Higher Education Commission’s performance-based funding 
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policies in 1974 (Bogue and Brown 1982, 123). In this analysis, Bogue and Brown noted 
that focusing on enrollment rather than outcomes in funding policy “…tends to 
emphasize growth as a measure of achievement—to obtain additional dollars, an 
institution has to add students…it displaces an institution’s purpose [emphasis added]” 
(124). These early Tennessee studies are significant and informative from the historical 
perspective, and the observations of early participants and researchers such as Bogue and 
Brown (1982) illuminate the importance of the institutional mission as a critical 
component of institutional funding. This is a focus that will be examined further in the 
pages to follow. 
 In 1986, the National Governors’ Association (NGA) released Time for Results, a 
publication that identified an urgent need for increased clarity and specificity in the 
identification of educational outcomes (Adleman and Carey 2008, 2). This book brought 
attention to the growing focus on assessment taking place at that time (NGA 1986), and 
its publication has contributed to a lasting emphasis on efficiency and accountability at 
the secondary and higher education levels (Burke and Associates 2002, 2-5), as well as an 
increased understanding of the economic and political pressures in accountability 
systems. 
A Developing Understanding of Higher Education Cost Structure 
 
The emerging scholarship in the area of assessment and outcomes took shape 
within the context of a simultaneous, growing understanding of higher education markets 
as multi-dimensional (Cohn, et al. 1989, 284). A number of institution-level analyses of 
higher education outputs have followed the foundational cost structure work of William 
Baumol (1982) in this arena, including Cohn, Rhine, and Santos (1989); de Groot et al. 
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(1991); and Dundar and Lewis (1995). Baumol’s influential work throughout the years 
has addressed issues of price, scale, and productivity analysis, and this work has had a 
lasting impact on economic analysis in fields such as health care and higher education 
(Cohn, Rhine, and Santos 1989, 285; Nordhaus 2008). In this regard, Paulsen and Smart 
(2001) note that most studies have failed to recognize the multi-product nature of higher 
education’s economic output (Paulsen and Smart 2001, 162), with the result that many 
studies have produced “biased, if not misleading, conclusions regarding costs and 
economies of scale and scope” (162). They further observe that a persistent challenge for 
research addressing financial issues in higher education is tied to the fact that “[t]he 
outputs and outcomes of education are typically not clearly defined and measured” (163).  
A further complication of applying standard cost analyses in higher education 
financial research is that, as Paulsen and Smart (2001) put it, “not only the quantity of 
outputs [of non-profit universities], but also their qualities are desirable outputs” (163). 
This issue has a subtle but important effect on the identification of mission-specific goals 
and outputs in relation to cost. Applying the cost function to higher education outputs and 
products, especially given the fact that non-profit universities are not necessarily 
motivated to minimize cost (Brinkman 1990, 110), is addressed in the work of Howard 
Bowen (1980); Verry (1987); Cohn, Rhine, and Santos (1989); and others. Although 
these researchers have provided a solid foundation for cost analysis in higher education, 
significant challenges remain. Drawing on a recent example in the literature, Pantuosco, 
Ullrich, and Pierce’s (2013) consideration of state-level higher education spending 
reveals that although state-level higher education spending increased substantially from 
1997 to 2009, this spending was not significantly correlated with measures of 
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undergraduate degree attainment during that period (Pantuosco, Ullrich, and Pierce 2013, 
163). The research questions addressed by this present study offer insight into one 
important aspect of this issue, namely the significance of the multi-output funding 
approaches in state-level performance funding policies. 
The National Landscape: Moving Toward Accountability 
 
Throughout the 1990s, state-level performance budgeting continued to grow in 
popularity as well as sophistication. By the end of the decade, Zumeta observed that 
“…we may be witnessing the initial phases of a historically sharp increment in the degree 
of government involvement in academic matters” (Zumeta 1998, 5). Zumeta’s 
examination of the rise of outcomes accountability included an essential challenge to 
consider the social implications of increasing external accountability demands upon U.S. 
university systems (6-8). A number of researchers also began to evaluate the expanding 
state-level policy initiatives taking shape during that time. In particular, Melkers and 
Willoughby (1998) considered the relative effectiveness among states in holding agencies 
accountable for budget policy. Their broad state-level policy survey is meaningful both 
for its understanding of the range of policies that existed among states at that time, as 
well as for the means of obtaining and using various metrics in policy implementation 
(Melkers and Willoughby 1998, 68-69). Based on their evaluation of evidence of the gap 
between policy and implementation through the use of case studies, they concluded that 
“[t]he future of this effort is unclear” (70).    
The growing popularity of performance funding initiatives in the late 1990s led to 
a number of analyses by higher education commissions in the early 2000s. From 2000 to 
2008, the National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education (NCPPHE) published 
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their annual Measuring Up report, which served as a “state-by-state report card” 
(NCPPHE 2008, 14) of state-level higher education performance. In a similar vein, the 
Commission on the Future of Higher Education initiated a 2006 study examining the 
status of information gathering at the state level (Adleman and Carey 2008, 1). Education 
Sector has published similar evaluations, such as their 2008 fifty-state analysis of data 
collection and usage patterns for state-level data (1).  
Noteworthy among the research that was taking shape in the early 2000s is the 
work of Joseph C. Burke. The work of Burke and Associates (2002) is frequently cited as 
a foundational resource for higher education researchers and administrators. Using data 
collected as part of the State Higher Education Financial Officer (SHEFO) surveys (10), 
Burke and Associates’ analysis contributed substantial clarity to an understanding of the 
primary differences in program implementation, characteristics, challenges (27-30), and 
levels of connection between performance indicators and financial policies (21-23). 
Particularly valuable in this collection of studies is Burke’s own evaluation of the closure 
of performance funding systems in Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky, and Minnesota, in 
which he observed that for these states, funding models were “easier to start than sustain” 
(219).   
Several recent studies illustrate the growing emphasis on performance funding at 
the national level. A 2013 study conducted by the National Association of State Budget 
Officers (NASBO) identified several major trends pointing to the need for greater 
performance-based funding measures by states. By using the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project’s 
“education and related” per-student metric that measures the “direct per student costs” for 
students (NASBO 2013, 6), NASBO observed an “unsustainable cost model” (8) in 
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higher education spending, in which net tuition revenue rises while spending remains flat 
and per-student appropriations falls over time (NASBO 2013, 7-8). With a 40-plus year 
downward trend in state per-student appropriations (4), tuition has continued to rise while 
universities have generally employed a strategy of “cost shifting” rather than cost 
reduction (9).  
Based on these cost model findings, NASBO identified a compelling need for 
states to develop more effective strategies to achieve “influence over the priorities and 
outcomes of public higher education institutions” in order to increase efficiency and re-
orient the cost model for greater sustainability (NASBO 2013, vi). According to the 
study, this effort must include leveraging the availability of state-level performance data 
(vi); in short, states must “fix the metric” (vi). In fact, they argue that “perhaps 
[performance funding’s] greatest benefit at this point is in helping to align public goals 
with institutional missions” (vi).  
Performance Indicators in Education Research 
 
Several state-level studies conducted in recent years have evaluated the 
significance of performance indicators with regard to the effectiveness of funding policy. 
Contemporary research has so far focused primarily on such issues as the nature of 
indicator selection, the capacity for data collection (Ewell and Jones 1994), and the 
relationship of performance indicators to institutional mission (Burke and Associates 
2002, 225 et al.). A number of studies have also focused specifically on the political 
implications of performance indicator selection (Toutkoushian and Hollis 1998; Layzell 
1999; Shin 2010; and Crellin et al. 2011), which are of particular importance to the 
selection of control variables in this study.  
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As financial research began to address economies of scope in higher education 
output analysis in the late 1980s, progress in the application of new models of higher 
education funding analysis began to take shape as well. In addition to the work of Cohn, 
Rhine, and Santos (1989) and de Groot et al. (1991) cited above, Paulsen and Smart 
(2001) also note Nelson and Hevert (1992), Lloyd, Morgan, and Williams (1993), and 
Dundar and Lewis (1995) as key studies addressing the multi-output nature of non-profit 
higher education cost structures (Paulsen and Smart 2001, 178-179). Although the 
literature does reveal extensive work in this complex field, much additional research is 
needed in light of shifting economic and political demands in order to address the 
challenges of adapting methodologies, indicator selection, and other parameters (179-
182). This present study seeks to gain insight into this question through the use of 
multilevel analysis: by analyzing the behavior of funding policy both within states at the 
institutional level and between states over time, the results of this study will potentially 
offer greater insight into whether funding policy solutions are primarily associated with 
factors at the state level, or whether institutions themselves bear the majority of 
responsibility for achieving desired outcomes. 
The availability of state-level data from both the State Higher Education Finance 
Officers (SHEFO) and State Higher Education Executive Officers (SHEEO) surveys 
beginning in the late 1990s provided researchers with much more comprehensive data 
than were previously available. This has made possible a more substantial consideration 
of the importance of indicators and metrics for outcome evaluation. In 1999, Daniel 
Layzell examined state-level policy implementation practices based on those reported in 
the SHEEO survey. Layzell observed that these responses report “data availability” as a 
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primary factor in the selection of performance indicators (Layzell 1999, 237). Shin and 
Milton (2004), Burke and Associates (2002, 11), and others have offered analyses of 
SHEEO and SHEFO survey data as well. Shin and Milton outlined the most commonly 
used performance indicators (2004, 4), noting that the 1997 survey results show 
graduation rate to be the most frequently cited indicator, a factor in use by thirty-two 
states at that time (4).  
The literature shows that performance indicator selection has been impacted not 
only by higher education’s complex cost structure and financial roles, but by equally 
complex political roles as well. Barnetson and Cutright’s (2000) observation of a gap in 
the research with regard to performance indicator studies in higher education led to their 
argument that performance research tends to “focus on issues of effectiveness and 
efficiency rather than social justice and democracy” (277). This evaluation emphasizes 
the inherently political nature of performance indicators: Barnetson and Cutright offer the 
premise that performance indicators are not only descriptive but prescriptive as well, with 
the potential to become “conceptual technologies that shape what issues we think about 
and how we think about those issues by embedding normative assumptions into the 
selection and structure of those indicators” (277).  
In 2010, Jung Cheol Shin published an analysis of the impact of policy reform on 
institutional performance, as measured by the dependent variables graduation rate and 
federal research funding level (Shin 2010, 47). Importantly, Shin’s analysis identified no 
statistically significant increase in performance (63), and his work raises additional 
questions to be addressed in this present study and future research. Shin’s research 
design, his use of HLM analysis, and selection of covariates (54) all inform this study. 
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First, Shin’s treatment of federal research funding as a dependent variable (Shin 2010, 
53), rather than as an input driving institutional outcomes, brings to light an important 
point about the inherently cyclical nature of university funding in general. Second, Shin’s 
application of HLM analysis methods in his research design is an important reminder of 
the multilevel nature of education data. Multilevel analysis has been used in a number of 
other social science contexts (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002) and will be used in this 
present study. Although progress continues to be made in the use of multilevel analysis in 
higher education research, the literature reveals a great deal of unrealized opportunity in 
the analysis of longitudinal education data.  
Several budgetary studies including Shugart (2013), Dougherty and Hong (2006), 
and Crellin et al. (2011) have examined the significance of mission-specific performance 
factors from the community college perspective. As Zarkesh and Beas (2004) have 
observed, completion rate is often a much less relevant outcomes indicator for 
community colleges than for four-year colleges and universities (64). Shugart noted that 
completions can be tailored to include “graduation or successful transfer” (Shugart 2013, 
n.p.) in order to target the particular mission of two-year institutions more accurately. 
From this perspective, Crellin et al. (2011) observed that when completions are 
incorporated into funding formulae, they “are incentivized to care much more for student 
success than for student quantity” (3). The incentivizing impact of performance indicator 
selection, and the subsequent effect this can potentially have upon the development of 
institutional priorities and policy decisions, are topics that offer opportunities for much 
more extensive research. 
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In 2006, Dougherty and Hong evaluated the role of performance policies at the 
community college level using interviews with institutional officials in six states. Their 
findings are instructive as well as cautionary: while institutions are often treated by the 
state as inherently able to carry out the policies upon which their funding depends, 
Dougherty and Hong’s results show otherwise (2006, 73-75). Their qualitative study 
revealed situations for some community colleges in which “lack of technical or other 
resources...” created challenges for the institutions in simply “trying to keep up with 
things” (73). Furthermore, their research points to the risk in making the assumption that 
officials are even aware of the policy standards under which they are being evaluated 
(66), as they point out with regard to funding policies for community college transfer 
rates in the state of California (66-67). While these findings are derived specifically from 
community college analyses, they offer cautionary guidance for the scope of research 
across all types of public institutions. Certainly, the literature in this area shows the 
degree to which policy implementation depends on the initiative and compliance of 
individual institutions. This is an issue that will be addressed further in Chapter 5 in light 
of this study’s results. 
 While a substantial amount of performance funding research deals with the 
capacity of policy to move institutions and states toward intended outcomes, Dougherty 
and Reddy (2013, 71-77) have also identified a number of unintended consequences of 
performance funding that are presented in the literature. While the research in this regard 
is limited, a number of state-level studies have revealed the added commitments of both 
time and money that are often required of institutions for funding compliance (Dougherty 
and Reddy 2013, 71). They also note the research of Jenkins, Ellwein, and Boswell 
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(2009) and Bell (2005), which have observed the role of performance funding policy in 
the “narrowing of institutional missions” (Dougherty and Reddy 2013, 72). Related to 
this issue is the potential significance of performance funding as a disincentive to remain 
focused on academic transfer rates or on programs that are not directly rewarded by 
performance funding policies (72, from Jenkins, Ellwein, and Boswell 2009, 36-37).  
Panel Data and Methodology 
 
The use of publicly available panel data in higher education research reveals both 
expanding opportunities and continued challenges. A number of studies, including Shin 
and Milton (2004), Shin (2010), and Sav (2011), illustrate varying approaches in the 
analysis of Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) panel data (e.g., 
Sav 2011, 146). The work of Toutkoushian and Hollis (1998) provides an example of the 
selection of state-level controls in higher education panel data analysis and the impact it 
can have on interpretation.  
The literature shows that the use of multilevel methods in higher education data 
analysis has increased in frequency in recent years (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, xix), in 
part due to the availability and processing power of modern statistical software (xxi). 
However, with regard to performance-based funding analysis specifically, Dougherty and 
Reddy’s (2013) review of research designs and indicator selection in performance-
funding analysis identifies only a small number of studies employing hierarchical linear 
models (56).  
Thomas Rabovsky’s (2012) research methodology is particularly instructive for 
this present study. Rabovsky’s analysis of the significance of higher education 
performance funding programs on both state budgets and institutional spending priorities 
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(Rabovsky 2012, 675) is built around an examination of Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data Systems (IPEDS) outcomes data (2012, 680). Rabovsky’s use of publicly 
available federal data points to the considerable value of longitudinal datasets in funding 
research, as well as the importance of selecting an appropriate methodological approach. 
In particular, Rabovsky’s use of IPEDS data has enabled him to go beyond a 
straightforward evaluation of the relationship between funding and outcomes to construct 
a regression model that evaluates elements of “institutional behavior” as a component of 
performance funding analysis (680). This involves modeling the significance of spending 
priorities such as research spending upon the underlying “causal logic” within the 
institutions themselves (679).  
Rabovsky observed that most higher education performance funding studies have 
evaluated only the direct relationship between funding and outcomes, without 
appreciating the intermediary “causal logic” that comprises the chain of decisions 
between funding and outcomes (Rabovsky 2012, 679). This intermediary impact, 
Rabovsky notes, can include the effect that performance policies can have upon the 
restructuring of incentives, which in turn produces an “administrative response” that 
yields a change in outcomes (679). Because most studies have evaluated only the direct 
relationship between performance indicators and outcomes without considering the 
intermediary causal steps, an appreciable level of insight into the role of socioeconomic 
factors and institutional behavior is often lost (697). Rabovsky’s analysis did not identify 
a statistically significant relationship between state-level funding policy and outcomes; 
however, he noted the need for further research on mission-based differentiation in state 
funding formulae (Rabovsky 2012, 697).  
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As the literature makes clear, substantial economic work continues to be done in 
the arena of higher education funding analysis. However, the literature is much less clear 
with regard to the basis upon which state-level political decisions are made. Because 
performance-based funding policies are developed at the state level, the role of political 
forces and decision-making processes must be carefully understood as a significant 
component of the funding process. The next section will explore the literature regarding 
the political nature of higher education performance funding. 
Political Forces Driving Performance Funding 
 
 A number of recent studies have explored the inherently political nature of higher 
education funding at the state level, addressing a range of issues including policy 
development and implementation (Carnevale, Johnson, and Edwards 1998; Dougherty, 
Natow, Hare, and Vega 2010), as well as the effect and significance of performance 
funding on outcomes and reporting (Cohen and Kisker 2009; Rabovsky 2012). Zarkesh 
and Beas (2004) highlighted a key observation about the political context of performance 
funding research and implementation, noting that state-level budget initiatives are often 
driven more by the political priorities of policy advocates than by the particular mission-
focused needs of the states (Zarkesh and Beas 2004, 63-64).  
With regard to the political process, John Kingdon’s (1995) examination of the 
political environment in which ideas arise (and the conditions under which they take root) 
offers particularly valuable insight here. Kingdon observed that political issues arise 
within the context of separate “streams,” including “problems, solutions, participants, and 
choice opportunities” (90). Because each stream “has a life of its own” apart from other 
separate channels (90), many policy theories and potential solutions remain unattached to 
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specific political problems (Kingdon 1995, 123). Political motivations for enacting 
legislation often arise only when an idea that has been sustained in one political stream 
becomes attached, through a window of opportunity, to another stream (123). Burke and 
Associates (2002) observed the applicability of Kingdon’s theory to the increased 
popularity of performance funding in the 1990s (Burke and Associates 2002, xiv). As 
they observed, “The intersection of problems and politics caused a search for a new 
budgeting policy” (xv). In particular, financial pressures from the impact of a recession 
on state revenues brought both budgetary cuts and increased public scrutiny to what were 
becoming viewed as inefficiencies in higher education (xiv).  
In recent years, the political rhetoric surrounding state performance-based funding 
initiatives has revealed both the political passion and empirical uncertainty impacting 
these programs. Case studies are presented here from Louisiana and Ohio as illustrations 
of this trend. The state of Louisiana has experimented with forms of both performance 
funding and performance budgeting since 2001 (Burke and Associates 2002, 24-25); 
however, the IPEDS data presented in Table 2 for Louisiana shows that public university 
six-year graduation rates have varied widely in the state between 2002 and 2010: 
Table 2: Louisiana Public University Six-Year Graduation Rates, 2002-2010 
Year Six-Year Graduation Rate 
2002 31.09 
2003 29.19 
2004 27.23 
2005 31.62 
2006 26.15 
2007 35.54 
2008 34.90 
2009 35.81 
2010 33.01 
Source: NCES: Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/, 
January 4, 2014 
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In 2010, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal signed the state’s “Granting Resources 
and Autonomy” (GRAD) Act, which offered an incentive-based variation of its existing 
performance funding policies. These new incentives included “increased autonomy and 
flexibility” over factors such as tuition and fee levels when institutions reach performance 
benchmarks (State of Louisiana 2014). Furthermore, in 2013, Louisiana State 
Representative Steve Carter spoke to the Louisiana Senate Education Committee in favor 
of Senate Bill 117, which proposed the creation of an “Outcomes-Based Funding Task 
Force” (Louisiana State Legislature 2014). As Carter stated, "…something needs to be 
done. And this may not be the end of all but it is a tremendous start…to ensure that every 
youngster in this state gets a quality education” (McGaughy 2013). However, as of June 
3, 2013, SB117 failed to pass, and this has halted progress toward the creation of this task 
force (State of Louisiana 2014). Because of these policy changes, additional years of data 
will be needed to evaluate the significance of Louisiana’s performance-based initiatives. 
In contrast to the Louisiana model, however, the story of performance-based 
funding in Ohio highlights a substantially more focused policy initiative. For many years, 
Ohio had relied on an enrollment-driven funding model that was operated within a highly 
decentralized state university governance structure (Burke and Associates 2002, 170). 
However, Ohio’s institutions were struggling to achieve successful academic outcomes, 
and its relatively low tax revenues had driven tuition levels ever higher in order to sustain 
funding levels (172-173). Because of this, in the mid 1990s public pressures to improve 
higher education accessibility and performance precipitated a change. Ohio’s newly 
formed Higher Education Funding Commission developed a streamlined performance-
funding model focusing on a few key indicators, rather than a more complex funding 
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formula that would have been difficult to implement (NCSL 2013). From both the 
political and institutional points of view, this approach proved to be successful. Ohio’s 
performance has continued to improve, and since that time the state has refined its 
performance-funding model with a greater focus on degree attainment rather than course 
completions (NCSL 2013). 
As the research literature has shown, state-level performance funding policies 
continue to be shaped by a complex range of political factors, and the political nature of 
performance funding impacts the efforts of both policy makers and the institutions being 
evaluated. As Moynihan (2008) stated, “we should put aside notions that performance 
data is neutral, scientific, or definitive, but assume that it represents the interests of an 
advocate seeking to persuade” (193). Moynihan argued that performance information 
might be better viewed as “an interactive dialogue between interested actors” (195). 
Taken together, the work of Kingdon and Moynihan both offer valuable reminders that 
the politically-charged motivations of entrenched interests can emerge in almost every 
component of performance funding, including the selection, implementation, and 
interpretation of funding formula components and outcomes metrics, as well as 
institutional reporting.  
Qualitative studies and interviews also reveal the effect that the implementation of 
performance funding policies can have on multiple levels of faculty and administration 
within a given institution. Lorber (2001) interviewed eighteen Tennessee Technological 
University faculty members and administrators in his qualitative study of performance 
funding impact between 1979 and 1999. Although the majority of university officials 
identified a perceived association between performance funding and improved outcomes 
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(Lorber 2001, 67), few indicated an awareness of any direct policy changes, curricular 
changes, or other academic or accreditation-related policy implementations that were a 
direct result of performance funding (67). Lorber’s study highlights the potential 
breakdown that can occur in an institution within its internal policy communication and 
implementation procedures.  
 Furthermore, Cohen and Kisker (2009) observe that the pressure felt by 
institution-level actors in performance funding implementation can potentially lead to a 
shift in motivations, which can result in questionable and even deceptive behavior. As 
they note, “…in states where performance-based funding has been tried, some 
institutional managers have been tempted to be less than forthright about the data they 
submit” (Cohen and Kisker 2009, 522). In fact, Rabovsky noted several studies that 
observe the implications for research when institutions are tempted to “game the system” 
in their reporting, including the manipulation of outcomes data in order to maximize 
short-term funding at the expense of long-term strategic initiatives (Rabovsky 2012, 677).  
Gaining insight into the complexity of the relationship between performance 
funding and accountability is a central focus of this study, and its significance for both 
the interpretation of research and the future direction of state-level policy is considerable. 
In this regard, a review of the literature reveals that only a few state-level systems have 
been in existence long enough to provide meaningful data for analysis of policy change. 
Dougherty, Natow, Hare, and Vega (2010) highlighted the need for future research in 
their evaluation of Tennessee and Florida data as examples of “long-lasting state 
performance funding systems” (1). As they put it, because “the operation of political 
forces is not exhausted by the passage of legislation” (1), their analysis points toward an 
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important direction for future research as more states produce meaningful data. Their 
research offers particularly meaningful insight regarding the political and social sources 
of change in funding factors (Dougherty, Natow, Hare, and Vega 2010, 2-4). As an 
example, they described the Tennessee Higher Education Commission’s addition of 
transfer rates into the Tennessee funding formula, which was enacted after concerns 
about transfer issues by parents and students had reached the Tennessee legislature (3). 
Without the benefit of additional research in the relatively small number of states with 
sufficient longitudinal performance funding data, policy decisions such as these risk 
unintended consequences in their educational outcomes. 
From a policy standpoint, Dougherty, Natow, Hare, and Vega (2010) also point to 
significant reasons that performance funding has not spread more fully across the nation. 
Their qualitative research draws on interviews and existing research literature in order to 
evaluate several shared “circumstances” or factors among the six states that they 
identified as having encouraged the rise of performance funding models, including “a 
revenue/cost squeeze on elected government officials, business demand for greater 
government efficiency and lower costs, and a rising Republican presence in state 
legislatures” (Dougherty, Natow, Hare, and Vega 2010, 1). Interestingly, their study 
found that among the six states studied, public pressure was not generally a significant 
factor in the development of higher education policy (2). This finding, while beyond the 
scope of the present study, points to an important area for further research.   
Challenges to Performance Funding Policy 
 
Several studies have offered important critiques and limitations of the 
implementation, assumptions, and analysis of performance funding. In particular, 
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Dougherty and Hong (2006) observed several obstacles to reaching the stated goals of 
performance systems in the six states they observed, including the significant issue of 
“funding instability” (72). Harnisch (2011) noted the inconsistent track record of 
performance funding over time, observing that out of the 26 states that adopted 
performance-based funding models between 1979 and 2007 (3), many programs were 
eliminated due to such factors as state-level cuts, misalignment of measurements and 
campus missions (3), and “lack of sustained support from political and campus leaders” 
(3). Harnisch also observed that performance funding could reduce incentives for 
institutions to address issues of access, especially for low-income students (8). Some 
critics argue that by rewarding a focus upon a limited subset of outcomes, performance 
funding fundamentally distorts the missions of universities, potentially encouraging a 
move away from equally valuable, if less quantifiable, benefits of higher education (8).  
The failure of the Arkansas performance-based funding model in the late 1990s is 
an interesting example of the consequences of poor alignment between funding and 
mission. Burke and Associates (2002) observe that one factor leading to the dismantling 
of the Arkansas performance funding program in the 1990s was a failure to differentiate 
between mission-based institutional differences, and even between two-year and four-
year institutional categories (225). Their “monolithic model that covered all institutions, 
whatever their differences in sector or mission” (225) yielded frustration and infighting 
among the institutions that suffered from the poorly implemented distribution model 
(225). 
As mentioned above, the literature points to the critical nature of implementation 
as a function of policy communication, and in this light Burke and Minassians (2003) 
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observed what they consider to be “a common and fatal flaw” (Burke and Minassians 
2003, 20) in funding policy implementation. Their analysis is based on 2003 State Higher 
Education Finance Officers (SHEFO) survey data. At the institutional level, they noted 
that performance-based funding as an overall strategy often does not translate down to 
the internal decision-making structure of the university. In their analysis, they observe 
that unless internal departments are held to the same standards of implementation that 
university systems themselves are, performance-based systems are “unlikely to improve 
substantially the performance of colleges and universities” (Burke and Minassians 2003, 
20).  
Interestingly, in this regard the rhetoric of concern surrounding performance 
funding has often magnified what is for many states a relatively small budgetary impact 
(Burke and Associates 2002, 266-267). Since many state policies currently reserve only a 
minimal percentage of total funding to performance measures (National Conference of 
State Legislatures [NCSL] 2013), Burke and Associates are correct in noting that 
“[p]erformance funding really represents more of a conceptual than a funding shift” 
(Burke and Associates 2002, 267). The potential policy implications of this observation 
will be addressed further in Chapter 5, with specific regard to the results of this study. 
 While considerable progress has been made since the 1980s in the examination of 
performance funding’s association with institutional outcomes, Rabovsky observed that 
as of 2012, “serious gaps” still remained in the understanding of performance funding’s 
significance for both the institutional and state levels in higher education (Rabovsky 
2012, 676). The research literature repeatedly points to the significance of the mediating 
role of state-level political and economic factors. Clearly, performance-based funding 
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policies do not exist in a vacuum, and they are rarely implemented apart from the 
complex interplay of outside political issues. The literature reveals the need to focus 
carefully on mediating economic factors, duration, and degree of implementation as 
variables in quantitative analysis (Shin 2010, et al.), and for this reason, this study will 
incorporate a wide range of socioeconomic control variables.  
Summary 
 
As the literature shows, within a span of less than 50 years performance funding 
has emerged as a major component of higher education budget policies in many states. 
During this same time period, these funding initiatives have in some cases retracted as 
initial programs began to fail in many states, and then re-emerged again in recent years as 
economic and political forces placed additional pressures on state funding policy. While a 
limited number of studies have examined the role of specific performance-funding 
policies implemented on individual state levels, the research in general has not found 
significant evidence of any meaningful association of performance-based higher 
education funding with higher education outcomes measures through the analysis of 
longitudinal data (Dougherty and Reddy 2013, 79-80). A clear need exists for a much 
more thorough understanding of the behavior, significance, and limitations of 
performance indicators in higher education funding, and this current study is designed to 
address these gaps in the research literature.  
In essence, the literature surrounding performance-based funding continues to 
wrestle with the underlying question of impact. As states continue to develop and 
promote performance-based initiatives that are often based on politically motivated goals, 
the need for further research regarding the most frequently selected performance 
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outcomes factors remains critical. It is the intent of this study to address the needs 
identified in the literature by evaluating the research hypotheses presented in Chapter 3. 
The following section will outline in detail the methodology and procedures that will be 
used in this analysis.   
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Chapter III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter will present a detailed outline of the study’s research design and 
methodology, including the specific measures and procedures that will be used to 
evaluate the research hypotheses presented below. First, the data sources for the study 
including the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database and other sources will be discussed, 
and the reliability and limitations of these data sources will be addressed. Next, the 
dependent, independent, and control variables that comprise this study’s longitudinal 
dataset will be presented. Based on the nature of the dataset, research questions, and 
conceptual framework, the selection of the methodological approach that will be used in 
this study will then be outlined, and the specific procedural steps that will be followed in 
order to evaluate the research hypotheses will be detailed. 
Research Questions 
 
 This study will examine the following research questions:  
1. Is the amount of state-level performance funding associated with completion rate as an 
institutional outcome in four-year public universities in the U.S. over time?  
2. Is the duration of state-level performance funding associated with completion rate as 
an institutional outcome in four-year public universities in the U.S. over time? 
3. Is the amount of state-level performance funding associated with retention rate as an 
institutional outcome in four-year public universities in the U.S. over time?  
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4. Is the duration of state-level performance funding associated with retention rate as an 
institutional outcome in four-year public universities in the U.S. over time?  
These research questions will be evaluated through an examination of the 
following null and alternative hypotheses for each pair of dependent and independent 
variables: 
I. Research Hypotheses for Amount and Completion 
Null Hypothesis (H0): Amount of performance funding at the state level is not 
associated with completion rate among U.S. four-year public universities. 
 
Alternative Hypothesis (H1): Amount of performance funding at the state level has 
a positive, statistically significant association with completion rate among U.S. 
four-year public universities. 
 
II. Research Hypotheses for Duration and Completion 
 
Null Hypothesis (H0): Duration of performance funding at the state level is not 
associated with completion rate among U.S. four-year public universities. 
 
Alternative Hypothesis (H1): Duration of performance funding at the state level 
has a positive, statistically significant association with completion rate among 
U.S. four-year public universities. 
 
III. Research Hypotheses for Amount and Retention 
Null Hypothesis (H0): Amount of performance funding at the state level is not 
associated with retention rate among U.S. four-year public universities. 
 
Alternative Hypothesis (H1): Amount of performance funding at the state level has 
a positive, statistically significant association with retention rate among U.S. 
four-year public universities. 
 
IV. Research Hypotheses for Duration and Retention 
 
Null Hypothesis (H0): Duration of performance funding at the state level is not 
associated with retention rate among U.S. four-year public universities. 
 
Alternative Hypothesis (H1): Duration of performance funding at the state level 
has a positive, statistically significant association with retention rate among U.S. 
four-year public universities. 
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Description of the Dataset 
 
The research hypotheses will be evaluated through the quantitative analysis of a 
50-state panel dataset, representing the population of all institutions from the IPEDS: 
Delta Cost Project Database matching the Carnegie classifications “Public Bachelors,” 
“Public Masters,” and “Public Research” (NCES 2013a), during the years 2004 to 2010. 
The unit of observation in this study will be examined on three levels: level one is the 
individual observation (institution-year); level two is the institution level; and level three 
is the state level. The dataset contains 3,372 individual observations, which will provide 
the first level of the hierarchical analysis. These individual observations are grouped into 
482 institution-level units based on the IPEDS variable unitid, which will provide the 
second level of analysis. The institution-level units are then organized into 50 state-level 
groupings across seven years, ranging from 2004 to 2010.  
In addition to this seven-year longitudinal panel, 482 observations from the year 
2003 will be added in order to create initial values for the lagged independent variable 
Amount. The size of the panel will allow for evaluation using pooled Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) analysis as well as hierarchical linear regression (HLM) modeling, which 
will enable the evaluation of multilevel variation among institutions, states, and levels of 
performance-based funding implementation over time (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, 4). 
In this dataset, the following 14 states are represented by at least one year of 
performance funding implementation during the 2004-2010 period: Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Tennessee (NCES 2013a). During the years 2004 to 
2010, 200 institutions within these 14 states were impacted by performance funding for at 
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least one year. Each of these states has a Duration value greater than zero for at least one 
year during the years 2004 to 2010, as illustrated in Table 7 in Appendix A. There are 
421 institutions in 36 states that did not implement performance funding during this 
period, and these states therefore have Duration values of zero for each year in the 
dataset. 
In addition to the institution-level data obtained through IPEDS, state-level 
control variables will be added to the panel data from sources including the National 
Conference of State Legislatures [NCSL] (2013), Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS] 
(2013), and Bureau of Economic Analysis [BEA] (2013) datasets. These data sources and 
the control variables added from these sources are outlined in detail below. 
All dollar values in the data including tuition, tax revenue, and state-level 
appropriations will be scaled to 2010 dollars using the Higher Education Price Index 
(HEPI) (Lenihan 2012, 3) for consistent comparison across years and sectors (Gillen and 
Robe 2011, 4). The Commonfund Institute maintains the HEPI, and beginning with 2002 
data, Commonfund rescaled this index to reflect a more accurate comparison between the 
HEPI and Consumer Price Index (CPI) (Commonfund Institute 2013). These rescaled 
index values for each year are used by the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database, and they 
are reflected in the 2004 to 2010 panel data evaluated in this study. As Gillen and Robe 
point out, “[t]he main use of price indices is to allow for valid comparisons of values 
from different years and also to allow for comparisons across sectors” (Gillen and Robe 
2011, 4). However, they also note that the Higher Education Price Index must be 
carefully applied in economic arguments, to avoid out-of-context comparisons such as a 
false sense of equivalency among economic sources (for instance, potentially conflating a 
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description of “what happened” with “an argument for why it happened”) (Gillen and 
Robe 2011, 4). The application of these issues with regard to the interpretation of this 
study’s results will be addressed in Chapter 5. 
Sample Size and Reliability of Data Sources 
 
 There are 3,372 individual observations represented in the panel dataset for the 
criteria selected for this study. However, institutions have in some cases not reported all 
data points for each year, and for this reason these observations form an unbalanced 
panel. The maximum sample for which all variable data are present is represented by 
2,452 observations. For this reason, in order to obtain a balanced panel dataset, this 
study’s analysis will employ a sample of 2,452 observations representing 482 institutions 
within 50 states. 
The IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database is a publicly available, longitudinal 
dataset developed by the American Institutes for Research and currently maintained by 
the National Center for Education Statistics (Lenihan 2012, 1). This dataset was 
developed with the goal of “mak[ing] data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (IPEDS) more readily usable for longitudinal analysis” (1). The IPEDS 
survey is a mandatory reporting requirement for all educational institutions that receive 
federal Title IV funds (“Higher Education Opportunity Act”, P. L. 110-315), and as a 
result, the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database represents all institutions in this 
population. In addition to IPEDS data, limited amounts of data obtained through the 
Financial Institution Shared Assessment Program (FISAP) are also incorporated into the 
dataset (NCES 2011, 3).  
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Since the results of the first IPEDS reporting year became available in 1987 
(Fuller 2011, 6), many changes have taken place including the expansion of scope of the 
IPEDS survey (6), as well as changes to institutions and state university systems. Also, 
federal reporting requirements have continued to evolve, including those mandated 
through the 1998 amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1965, which served to 
expand the amount of “‘consumer information’ that NCES is required to provide” (Fuller 
2011, 8). Because of this, the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project has attempted to maximize the 
consistency and reliability of IPEDS data across the 1987-2010 time period by 
harmonizing annual reporting results (NCES 2011, 4), creating consistent primary key 
identifiers, and developing “matched sets” wherever possible for institutional data in 
order to maximize the amount of complete information across the full dataset’s span of 
years (Fuller 2011, 2). 
Where single-year gaps in data exist, the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database 
presents imputed values (NCES 2011, 10-11), unless those values arise at either the first 
or last position in the longitudinal series (11). Where gaps of two or more years exist, no 
data are imputed (11). The standards for IPEDS reporting continue to be guided by the 
U.S. Department of Education through the National Center for Education Statistics 
(Fuller 2011, 1), and as a whole, the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database represents a 
very high quality, reliable source of higher education data. 
The preparation of data for this study will also involve the incorporation of 
publicly available state-level financial information from three additional data sources. 
First, the Bureau of Census conducts the Current Population Survey (CPS) monthly for 
the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 2013). This survey’s 
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published results include average annual unemployment rates by state. These rates will be 
added as the control variable Unemployment by state for each institution in the IPEDS: 
Delta Cost Project Database from 2004 to 2010.  
In addition, the U.S. Department of Commerce publishes quarterly National 
Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) estimates through the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA 2012). These estimates outline a broad range of economic output 
measures designed to “serve as primary indicators of the current condition of the U.S. 
economy” (BEA 2012, 3). State-level personal income is published as a component of 
these reports each year, and these values will be added as the control variable Income in 
this study for each institution in the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database from 2004 to 
2010. Because the NIPA estimates are a component of the System of National Accounts 
(SNA), they serve as a primary source of major economic drivers and economic modeling 
for the federal government (5). As such, the accuracy and reliability of these systems are 
watched closely, and the revision models and other aspects of the NIPA estimates are 
addressed in detail in the literature (Mayerhauser and Pack 2013). 
The Urban Institute-Brookings Institution Tax Policy Center has compiled data 
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Annual Survey of State and Local Government Finance 
(Tax Policy Center 2013). These data include per-capita tax revenue collected by each 
state for selected years, including the years 2004 to 2010 that will be evaluated in this 
study. These values will be used to construct the state-level control variable Tax for each 
institution in the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database. 
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Description of Measures 
 
This section outlines the dependent, independent, and control variables that will 
be examined in this study. A detailed description of variables and descriptive statistics is 
presented in Tables 6 and 10 in Appendix A. All descriptive statistics presented in this 
section are produced using the Stata/IC 13.1 software package running on Mac OS X 
10.9.1. Final selection of the variables used in the regression analyses will depend on a 
full interpretation of the descriptive statistics, tests, and measures of fit reviewed in this 
section. These results and the full regression models will be presented in Chapter 4. 
Some of the variables in this study are based on per-student ratios derived from 
the IPEDS full-time equivalent (FTE) calculation of enrollment at each institution. These 
FTE values are calculated using the following formulae, based on the type of institution:  
Table 3: Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) Calculations Based on Student Classification 
Undergraduate enrollment at public four-
year institutions 
FTE = full-time count + part-time 
count*0.403543 
Undergraduate enrollment at all other 
institutions 
FTE = full-time count + part-time 
count*0.397058 
Enrollment in programs classified as First-
Professional 
FTE = full-time count + part-time 
count*0.6  
Graduate enrollment FTE = full-time count + part-time 
count*0.361702 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics (http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/glossary/index.asp) 
 
Dependent Variables.  The dependent variables Completion and Retention represent the 
most frequently used indicators of institutional success for four-year colleges and 
universities (Burke and Associates 2002, 46). The dependent variable Completion 
represents the student completion rate per institution per year, which is measured as the 
ratio of total student completions at each institution, divided by total full-time-equivalent 
(FTE) enrollment per year. These values will be calculated using the IPEDS variable 
totalcompletions, defined as “Number of total degrees, awards and certificates granted,” 
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and the IPEDS variable fte_count, defined as “Total fall FTE student enrollment” (NCES 
2013b).  
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The dependent variable Retention represents the percentage of FTE enrolled 
students who returned the following year at each institution. Full-time retention rate has 
consistently been one of the most commonly used performance indicators for four-year 
institutions in the research literature (Burke and Associates 2002, 69-71; Rabovsky 2012, 
680). The IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database variable ftretention_rate, defined as “Full-
time retention rate” (NCES 2013b), was incorporated as a data point in the IPEDS 
surveys in 2003 (Rabovsky 2012, 681), and Retention will be produced using this 
variable in the present study. 
Independent Variables. The following independent variables represent direct financial 
measures of state-level performance funding policy. By incorporating funding Duration 
as an independent variable in addition to total appropriation amount, this study addresses 
the research hypotheses by exploring a dimension of performance funding not frequently 
studied in the literature (Rabovsky 2012, 676; Shin 2010). 
The independent variable Amount represents the dollar amount of state-level 
appropriations per FTE student, measured in 2010 HEPI-adjusted dollars and lagged by 
one year. This variable represents the direct measure of performance funding for each 
institution (NCES 2013b). These values will be produced using the following IPEDS 
variables: state03 (”Revenue from state appropriations”) which is lagged by one year; 
fte_count (”Total fall FTE student enrollment”), which is lagged by one year; and 
hepi_scalar2010 (Higher Education Price Index (HEPI) 2010 scalar) (NCES 2013b).  
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Because states allocate performance-based funds for a given year based on the previous 
year’s outcomes, both state03 and fte_count are lagged by one year in the calculation 
above.  
The dependent variable Duration represents the cumulative number of years that 
each state’s performance funding policy has been implemented as of each year, for each 
institution. Table 7 in Appendix A presents the Duration values for each state in the 
dataset. The variable Duration was constructed using data compiled by the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL 2013). For example, if an institution’s state had 
first implemented its performance funding policy in 2002, the variable Duration would 
subsequently have a value of 2 for the year 2004. If a state discontinued its performance 
funding policy in a given year, Duration would then have a value of 0 beginning in the 
year the policy was discontinued. The addition of Duration as an independent variable 
will offer potential insight into the long-term behavior of performance funding in a way 
that has not yet been comprehensively examined in the literature. 
Institution-Level Control Variables. By accounting for the behavior of state and 
institution-level control variables in this study’s regression models, the additional effects 
of the independent variables can be more clearly understood in comparison to the 
unconditional model. A careful selection of control variables in this study is based on the 
review of the literature, availability of data, and potential relevance to the research 
questions listed above. These variables represent several characteristics of individual 
institutions in the dataset, which can exhibit variability across institutions in a given year, 
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and within individual institutions from year to year. Control variable selection makes use 
of the extensive range of information available through the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project 
Database in order to control for a number of factors that are potentially associated with 
performance at the institutional level.  
The institution-level control variable Pell represents the average federal Pell grant 
award per FTE student. The federal Pell grant is awarded to individual students based on 
their qualifications as determined through the Free Application for Federal Student Aid 
(FAFSA) (Federal Student Aid [FSA] 2014). These values are adjusted to 2010 dollars 
using the HEPI index. These values will be calculated using the following IPEDS 
variables: grant01 (”Pell Grants”); fte_count (“Total fall FTE student enrollment”); and 
hepi_scalar2010 (“Higher Education Price Index (HEPI) 2010 scalar”) (NCES 2013b).  
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Institution-level Carnegie Classification data are based on values of carnegie2005 
(“Carnegie Classification 2005”) in the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database (NCES 
2013b). The Carnegie Foundation developed a categorization for colleges and 
universities in the 1970s, and these classifications have become a standard method of 
controlling for institutional mission in higher education research (McCormick et al. 2009, 
145). Carnegie Classification categories have been revised several times since the 1970s, 
and the 2005 revisions incorporated a range of new factors that expanded their 
applicability and utility for higher education research (146). The Carnegie Classifications 
selected for analysis in this study include the values 15 to 23. This range of values 
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encompasses the groups of institutions for which the performance outcomes variables 
Completion and Retention represent the most relevant measures.  
In the Carnegie 2005 Classification, values 15-17 represent research universities. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, an example of an institution with this classification is the 
University of Tennessee, whose flagship campus is in Knoxville, Tennessee. In 2010, this 
university system had an enrollment of 43,905 full-time equivalent students, a mean 
completion rate of 22.55 percent, and a mean retention rate of 84.0 percent (NCES 
2013b). In addition, Carnegie Classification values 18-20 represent master’s degree 
granting colleges and universities. An example of this category is Indiana State 
University in Indianapolis, Indiana. In 2010, this institution had a full-time equivalent 
enrollment of 9,044 students, a mean completion rate of 22.9 percent, and a mean 
retention rate of 64.0 percent (NCES 2013b). Values 21-23 in the IPEDS data represent 
bachelor’s degree-granting colleges and universities using Carnegie Classifications. An 
example of an institution in this category is Wright State University in Dayton, Ohio. In 
2010, this institution had a full-time equivalent enrollment of 16,195 students, a mean 
completion rate of 22.67 percent, and a mean retention rate of 70.0 percent (NCES 
2013b).  
Using the IPEDS dataset variable carnegie2005 in this study’s analysis, these 
Carnegie Classification values have been recoded in order to create three dummy 
variables: Carnegie_Research, Carnegie_Masters, and Carnegie_Bachelors. Values 15 
through 17 have been coded Carnegie_Research = 1, values 18 through 20 have been 
coded Carnegie_Masters = 1, and values 21 through 23 have been coded 
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Carnegie_Bachelors = 1. Table 8 in Appendix A displays the distribution of institutions 
represented by each Carnegie 2005 Classification.  
The institution-level control variable SATMATH75 represents the College Board 
Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT) Math I scores at the 75th percentile. College entrance 
exam scores, including SAT and ACT test scores, are among the most commonly used 
measure of aptitude in higher education research. For instance, Grove, Wasserman, and 
Grodner (2006) observed that 70 percent of economics studies use college entrance 
scores as a proxy for aptitude (132). The values for SATMATH75 are calculated using the 
value satmt75 from the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database (NCES 2013b). In addition 
to the SAT I Math scores used in this study, SAT I Verbal scores at the 75th percentile are 
also available in the IPEDS dataset; however, a preliminary examination of variance 
inflation factors (VIF) reveals a relatively high degree of collinearity between SAT Math 
and Verbal scores. For this reason, only the IPEDS value SATMATH75 will be included 
in the study.  
The institution-level control variable Tuition represents the in-state tuition and 
fees established for each institution per year. The IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database 
reports several levels of tuition per institution that are based on student classifications and 
other categories. However, for the purposes of this study, the IPEDS variable 
tuitionfee02_tf representing “in-state tuition and fees per student” will be used as a 
standard of comparison (NCES 2013b). These values are adjusted to 2010 dollars using 
the HEPI index. These values will be produced using the following IPEDS variables: 
tuitionfee02_tf  (“In-state tuition and fees for full-time undergraduates (Sticker price)”) 
and hepi_scalar2010 (Higher Education Price Index (HEPI) 2010 scalar) (NCES 2013b).  
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The institution-level control variable Faculty represents the average number of 
full-time instructional faculty employed at each institution per full-time equivalent (FTE) 
student, as reported by the institution. This ratio is commonly used in the research 
literature as a proxy for class size (Monks and Schmidt 2011, 1). These values will be 
calculated using the following IPEDS variables:  faculty_instr_headcount (“Total number 
of full-time instructional faculty”) and fte_count (“Total fall FTE student enrollment”) 
(NCES 2013b). 
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The institution-level control variable Minority represents the percentage of non-
white students enrolled at each institution per year. Ross and Kena (2012) reported 
considerable disparity in the percentage of students enrolled in college compared by 
racial category (Ross and Kena 2012, 162-163). While the importance of controlling for 
factors such as minority enrollment is well demonstrated in the research literature 
(Reardon and Robinson 2008, 497), methods for codifying and evaluating minority 
enrollment vary greatly (Martin et al. 2013, 641-642). Sirin’s (2005) meta-analysis of 
studies from 1990 to 2000 examined the relationship between socioeconomic status and 
academic achievement, showing that minority status had a moderating effect (417; 435). 
In this study, these values will be calculated using the following IPEDS variables: 
total_enrollment (“Total Enrollment”) and total_enrollment_white_tot (“Total 
Enrollment (White)”) (NCES 2013b).  
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State-Level Control Variables. The following variables represent characteristics of state-
level groupings. The additional economic data from the sources outlined below provide a 
much wider range of control variables than is available through IPEDS data alone.  This 
study follows the approach of hierarchical studies in performance funding such as Shin 
and Milton (2004), Shin (2010), and Rabovsky (2012) in the incorporation of state-level 
control variables, as discussed in Chapter 2. The variable Statenum translates the State 
text string name from the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project data into a corresponding integer 
value ranging from one to fifty, in order to provide a state-level grouping for hierarchical 
analysis.  
Because performance-based funding is developed and implemented at the state 
level, researchers including Dougherty and Reddy (2013) and Shin (2010, 54) have noted 
the importance of incorporating state-level variables to control for the impact of 
economic factors demonstrated in the literature (Shin and Milton 2004; Heller 1997). 
This can enhance the analytical potential of the state-level grouping in the hierarchical 
model. State-level control variables exhibit no variability for institutions within the same 
state for a given year. However, they do exhibit variability for institutions across different 
states within a given year, and across the longitudinal years of the dataset. 
A large number of studies have examined the significance of socioeconomic 
(SES) factors for student academic achievement, and a number of studies have drawn on 
Bureau of Labor Statistics longitudinal data such as the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth 1979 to examine these relationships (Jaeger 2012, 904-905). Three economic 
variables will be incorporated into the IPEDS dataset for this study. First, the state-level 
control variable Unemployment represents the unemployment rate reported by the U.S. 
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Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics for each state from 2004 to 2010. 
Individuals are classified as unemployed if they meet the following criteria: “Persons are 
classified as unemployed if they do not have a job, have actively looked for work in the 
prior 4 weeks, and are currently available for work” (BLS 2013).  
Next, the variable Income represents the average personal income reported by the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis for each state from 2004 
to 2010. These values are adjusted to 2010 dollars using the HEPI index, as described 
above. While studies have demonstrated a positive relationship between average earnings 
and such factors as educational enrollment (Braunstein, McGrath, and Pescatrice 1999), 
the wide range of analytical approaches in the research literature for factors such as 
family income reveals the complexity of evaluating and controlling for SES factors 
(Cameron and Taber 2004, 137). In this study, the state-level control variable Tax 
represents the average state and local tax revenue as reported by the Brookings 
Institution’s Tax Policy Center for each state from 2004 to 2010. These values are also 
adjusted to 2010 dollars using the HEPI index. 
Collinearity Analysis 
 
Final selection of variables for the HLM analysis depends on an examination of 
collinearity among potential regressors. Variance inflation factor analysis will provide the 
basis for rejecting any potential regressors for the HLM model that demonstrate a high 
level of collinearity (Chatterjee and Hadi 2012, 250). The selection of variables for the 
regression models in this study will be evaluated based on the results of this analysis. 
Table 9 in Appendix A presents the results of collinearity analysis, displaying the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) for each independent variable. A VIF statistic of 10 or 
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greater is an indication of collinearity among variables (Chatterjee and Hadi 2012, 250). 
In the results presented in Table 9, SATMATH75 and SATVERBAL75 exhibited a 
relatively high degree of collinearity, and for this reason SATVERBAL75 was not 
included in the final model. In addition, the variable Carnegie_Bachelors was removed 
from the analysis in order to avoid the presence of collinearity with the other two dummy 
variables, Carnegie_Research and Carnegie_Masters. All other independent variables 
fell within the recommended tolerance (250). 
Analytic Strategy 
 
This section will outline the specific steps that will be taken in order to build each 
level of the hierarchical model. The methodological approach selected for this study is 
based on a number of factors including the structure of the dataset itself (Luke 2004, 23), 
which is composed of institution-level observations nested within state-level groups, 
across a longitudinal dimension with repeated annual observations (NCES 2013a). As 
noted in Chapter 2, this study’s conceptual framework is based on the overarching issue 
of policy effectiveness in higher education performance-based funding. As the literature 
review makes clear, understanding policy effectiveness in performance funding requires 
an examination of policy implementation on multiple levels. Because of this, the research 
design and methodology outlined in this chapter have been selected with this conceptual 
framework in mind. The methodological approach for this study will involve the 
following steps:  
1. Evaluation of Descriptive Statistics. First, regressors will be selected based on an 
evaluation of descriptive statistics and collinearity analysis, and the preliminary 
evaluation of correlations among variables. Evaluation of descriptive statistics will 
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provide an understanding of central tendency and spread, and consideration of these 
factors will be instructive in determining the final selection of regressors for analysis. 
This preliminary exploration of the variables of interest will include examinations of 
means, standard deviations for each variable, and other descriptive statistics (Frees 2004, 
25). Correlation matrices and VIF statistics will also be evaluated to determine the 
significance of relationships, and the potential multicollinearity among covariates 
(Remler and Van Ryzin 2011, 297). This analysis will provide an initial evaluation of 
significant relationships among variables. Based on an evaluation of the descriptive 
statistics and measures of variance, an initial outline of significant relationships among 
variables will be developed.  
2. Pooled OLS Analysis. Next, pooled OLS will be performed on the unconditional 
models for Completion and Retention. This analysis will yield preliminary indications of 
statistically significant relationships. However, pooled OLS will not provide a sufficient 
basis upon which to make determinations about relationships within and between 
variables among the levels of analysis (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, 86-87).  
3. Unconditional HLM Model. The next step in this analysis will be the evaluation of the 
unconditional HLM model, which will provide information about variability within and 
among observations (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, 69). The appropriateness of HLM 
analysis will be determined through an evaluation of Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for each 
unconditional model (Hox 2010, 33-36). Because performance-based funding policies are 
implemented at the state level and carried out by individual institutions on an annual 
budgetary timeframe, the variables of interest in the IPEDS data correspond naturally to a 
three-level hierarchical framework. For this reason, hierarchical linear regression (HLM) 
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analysis is well suited as a methodological approach for this study (Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002, 4). This approach has been demonstrated in the literature to serve as an effective 
tool in higher education research. Variance components will be partitioned at each level 
of analysis in order to provide a baseline of comparison for the full model (Hox 2010, 69-
70). The ability to segment variability into groupings by level (Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002, 230) is a key advantage of multilevel analysis and will be discussed further in the 
interpretation of results in Chapter 4.  
4. Full HLM Model. At this point the full hierarchical model will be constructed, and the 
nested, multilevel models for both Completion and Retention will then be regressed using 
Stata software. The slopes and standard error components for the full model will be 
interpreted, and the significance of each level’s control variables will be evaluated by 
comparing the unconditional and full models (Hox 2010, 16; 77). Statistical significance 
of coefficients will be considered, and the research hypotheses will then be evaluated in 
light of these results for each level of the hierarchical model. Based on the results of this 
analysis, a full interpretation of results will follow in Chapter 5. 
The following section describes a generalized form of the hierarchical models that 
will be evaluated at each level of analysis. This three-level outline closely follows the 
model of Raudenbush and Bryk (2002, 229-234). The flexibility of the HLM model 
allows for the treatment of the longitudinal time-specific measure as level one, which in 
this case will represent each year of the institutional observations. At level one, the 
unconditional models for each dependent variable can be expressed as follows:  
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Level One: Observation-level. The level one unconditional model for Completion is 
expressed as follows: 
ܥ݋݉݌݈݁ݐ݅݋݊௜௝௞ = ߨ௜௝௞ ൅ ݁௜௝௞ 
 
in which ܥ݋݉݌݈݁ݐ݅݋݊௜௝௞ = completion rate for observation i, institution j, state k 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, 229). In this model, ߨ௜௝௞ = the average completion rate of 
institution j, state k, and ݁௜௝௞ = the random effect component (the deviation of an 
observation ijk’s completion rate from the mean institution) (229). Adding coefficients to 
this unconditional model yields the following: 
ܥ݋݉݌݈݁ݐ݅݋݊௜௝௞ = ߨ଴௝௞ ൅ ߨଵ௝௞ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௜௝௞ ൅ ߨଶ௝௞ܣ݉݋ݑ݊ݐ௜௝௞ ൅ ݁௜௝௞. 
 
The level one model for Retention will be constructed following the same structural 
pattern. 
Level Two: Institution-level. Extending this model to level two for each observation-level 
mean value of ߨ௜௝௞ above, Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) describe the institution-level 
model that be expressed as follows (229): 
ߨ଴௝௞ ൌ ߚ଴଴௞ ൅ ݎ଴௝௞ 
In this expression, ߚ଴଴௞= the mean completion rate for state k, and ݎ଴௝௞= the random 
effect for institution j. When the regressors from level two are added to this unconditional 
model, each observation-level coefficient from ߨଵ௝௞ to ߨ௣௝௞ will have the corresponding 
regression expression as follows: 
ߨ௣௝௞ ൌ
ߚ௣଴௞ ൅ ߚ௣ଵ௞݈݈ܲ݁ ൅ ߚ௣ଶ௞ܥܽݎ̴ܴ݊݁݃݅݁݁ݏ݁ܽݎ݄ܿ௣௝௞ ൅ ߚ௣ଷ௞ܥܽݎ̴݊݁݃݅݁ܯܽݏݐ݁ݎݏ௣௝௞ ൅
ߚ௣ସ௞ܵܣܶܯܣܶܪ͹ͷ௣௝௞ ൅ ߚ௣ହ௞ܶݑ݅ݐ݅݋݊௣௝௞ ൅ ߚ௣଺௞ܨܽܿݑ݈ݐݕ௣௝௞ ൅ ߚ௣଻௞ܯ݅݊݋ݎ݅ݐݕ௣௝௞ ൅ ݎ௣௝௞. 
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The level two regression equations for the dependent variable Retention will be 
constructed following the same pattern for each observation-level coefficient from ߨଵ௝௞ 
to ߨ௣௝௞ (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, 229-230).  
Level Three: State-level. At the state level, each coefficient from the institution-level 
expression will be represented as a function of level three (state-level) predictors (Luke 
2004, 10): 
ߚ଴଴௞ ൌ ߛ଴଴଴ ൅ ݑ଴଴௞ 
In this expression, ߛ଴଴଴ = the grand mean for Completion, and ݑ଴଴௞= the random effect 
component for state (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, 230). The state-level variables at this 
level of analysis are Unemployment, Income, and Tax, and for each coefficient in the 
range ߚ௣ଵ௞to ߚ௣௤௞the following full model can be expressed as follows: 
ߚ௣௤௞ ൌ ߛ௣௤଴ ൅ ߛ௣௤ଵܷ݊݁݉݌݈݋ݕ݉݁݊ݐ ൅ ߛ௣௤ଶܫ݊ܿ݋݉݁ ൅ ߛ௣௤ଷܶܽݔ ൅ ݑ௣௤௞. 
The level three regression equations for the dependent variable Retention will be 
constructed following the same pattern for each observation-level coefficient 
ߚ௣ଵ௞ ǥߚ௣௤௞. 
 Combining each level of analysis above yields the following, full model for 
Completion: 
Completion = B0 + B1Amount + B2*Minority + B3*Pell + B4*SATMATH75 + B5*Tuition 
+B6*Faculty + B7*Duration + B8*Tax + B9*Income + B10*Unemployment + 
B11*Carnegie_Research + B12*Carnegie_Masters 
 
In a similar way, the following full model is constructed for Retention: 
Retention = B0 + B1Amount + B2*Minority + B3*Pell + B4*SATMATH75 + B5*Tuition 
+B6*Faculty + B7*Duration + B8*Tax + B9*Income + B10*Unemployment + 
B11*Carnegie_Research + B12*Carnegie_Masters 
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Methodological Limitations of the Study 
 
This study contains several limitations in design and scope, and the nature of the 
data also yields certain delimitations that will be outlined here. While the IPEDS: Delta 
Cost Project Database contains a wide range of institution-level and state-level factors, 
this study will be limited to those primary indicators of student outcomes and primary 
funding components of state-level performance policies identified in the literature (Shin 
and Milton 2004, 4). As noted above, although the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database 
contains values representing institutions of all Carnegie 2005 Classifications, this study 
will be limited to those institutions for which Retention and Completion are the most 
accurate measures of institutional outcomes, namely those institutions with Carnegie 
Classification having values 15 to 23 in the IPEDS data (NCES 2013a). This limitation 
has a precedent in the literature with the Carnegie Classification selections used in the 
research design of Shin (2003). This selection of Carnegie values therefore excludes 
community and technical colleges, for-profit institutions, and other specialty institutions 
from the study (Zarkesh and Beas 2004, 70). 
An additional delimitation is the time period evaluated in this study, which will be 
restricted to the years 2004 to 2010. Although the National Center for Education 
Statistics began to collect a limited amount of data through the IPEDS survey beginning 
in 1987 (Fuller 2011, 5-6), the full range of variables evaluated in this study is not fully 
available prior to 2003. The time period selected for this study will allow for the analysis 
of a balanced panel dataset. 
Chapter 4 will present the test results for the analytical procedures outlined above. 
The results of each statistical test will be outlined, and statistical significance and other 
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appropriate measures will be presented for each analytical step (Rudestam and Newton 
2007, 121). Based on these findings, regression coefficients will be determined for the 
hierarchical models at each level for each dependent variable Completion and Retention. 
Based on these test results, an evaluation of the research hypotheses will then be 
presented. 
  
61 
 
 
 
Chapter IV 
 
FINDINGS 
 
By implementing the methodology outlined in Chapter 3, this study has sought to 
evaluate the association of performance-based funding policy Amount and Duration with 
the two most frequently-used measures of educational outcomes in U.S. public colleges 
and universities, which are Completion and Retention rates. The analytical strategy for 
this study has involved the following steps: first, descriptive statistics for the dependent 
and independent variables were analyzed, and variance inflation factor statistics were 
evaluated in order to determine the degree of collinearity among independent variables. 
Based on this preliminary analysis, the final selection of regressors was determined. 
Next, a pooled OLS model was evaluated without regard for the longitudinal and nested 
structure of the dataset, in order to gain preliminary insight into relationships between the 
dependent and independent variables.  
Following the evaluation of the pooled OLS model, an unconditional Hierarchical 
Linear Regression (HLM) model (also known as a multilevel model) for each dependent 
variable was evaluated, and the Intraclass Correlation (ICC) statistics for these models 
were calculated in order to assess the need for HLM. Finally, full HLM models for 
Completion and Retention were evaluated in order to determine slopes, standard errors, 
and the statistical significance of relationships at each level. Substantive conclusions are 
based on the analyses of the full multilevel models, and these results are presented in this 
chapter. These findings will be used to evaluate this study’s research hypotheses. 
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Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
 
First, descriptive statistics for the variables examined in this study are presented 
in Tables 10 through 12 in Appendix A. Table 12 shows that across all observations in 
the IPEDS dataset, public four-year colleges and universities from the years 2004 to 2010 
saw Completion rates increase at an average of .36 percent each year over the seven-year 
period, ranging from 22.84 percent in 2004 to 23.42 percent in 2010. Both performance 
funding states and non-performance states increased their mean Completion rates across 
the seven-year period; however, performance-based funding states increased Completion 
rates at a higher annual average rate than did non-performance funding states. In addition, 
performance-based funding states increased these average annual rates more often (in six 
out of seven years) than non-performance funding states did.  
The examination of descriptive statistics for the dependent variable Retention 
shows that while both performance-based funding states and non-performance funding 
states exhibited increases in Retention rates between 2004 and 2010, the rates for 
performance-based funding states increased at a higher average annual rate (.77 
percentage points per year) than non-performance funding states did (.56 percentage 
points per year). While this pattern seems to imply that performance-based funding 
policies have been successful in driving Retention rates, further analysis in the sections to 
follow will show that the relationship between funding policy implementation and 
Retention is statistically more complex. Understanding the scope of this relationship will 
depend on a full examination using multilevel analysis. 
An evaluation of the independent variables Duration and Amount reveals that, 
although the number of states and institutions that received performance-based funding 
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dollars did increase between the years 2004 and 2010, in general the average funding 
levels in those states changed minimally throughout that period. Specifically, in the 
IPEDS dataset sample for the year 2004, a total of 92 institutions among 9 states had 
received performance-based funding dollars for at least one year. In 2010, this number 
increased to 126 institutions in 12 states. Furthermore, among the states that received 
performance funding each year, the mean values for Amount stayed nearly unchanged, 
increasing from $7,040.93 in 2004 (in HEPI-scaled 2010 dollars) to $7,074.56 in 2010. 
However, it should be noted that although the mean values in the panel data for these 
years remained almost constant, funding levels in individual states in some cases changed 
substantially. The results of multilevel analysis will provide further insight into the 
significance of both the institution-level and state-level changes with regard to the 
dependent variables. 
These descriptive statistics paint a highly mixed picture of performance-based 
funding trends from 2004 to 2010. While growth trends in policy adoption at the state 
level are evident, the results of correlation analysis presented in Table 11 in Appendix A 
show that little correlation exists among the dependent variables Retention and 
Completion and the independent variables Amount and Duration in the pooled data. 
Furthermore, certain patterns that are apparent at the institutional level vary markedly 
from those observed at the state level. Based merely on these preliminary patterns, it is 
therefore tempting to conclude that these dependent and independent variables have no 
statistically significant relationships. However, due to the multilevel structure of the 
IPEDS data, these initial patterns and the results of correlation analysis alone do not 
provide a sufficient basis for this conclusion (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, 86-87). 
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Because of this, a pooled OLS regression model for each dependent variable was 
constructed, and the next section presents the results of the pooled OLS regression 
analysis. 
Pooled OLS Models 
 
At this stage of analysis, a full ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model was 
evaluated for each dependent variable using the regressors described in Tables 13 and 14 
in Appendix A. The results of this analysis were used to consider initial relationships 
among variables in the pooled IPEDS: Delta Cost Project dataset, without regard to the 
longitudinal and nested structure of the data. Tables 13 and 14 outline the results of this 
regression analysis. The adjusted R2 values for these models indicate that the regression 
model for Completion described approximately 33.08 percent of the relationship, and the 
regression model for Retention described approximately 55.04 percent of the relationship. 
The results of the OLS analysis for the Completion model indicate that a 
statistically significant relationship between Completion and the independent variable 
Amount does exist. However, given the range of values for Amount in the IPEDS dataset, 
this relationship represents only a very small practical range of effect. Further 
examination of the relationship between Completion and Amount will be discussed in the 
analysis of full HLM results below. In addition, no statistically significant relationship 
was identified between Completion and the independent variable Duration. 
Furthermore, the results of OLS analysis for the Retention model show no 
significant relationship between the dependent variable Retention and the independent 
variables Amount and Duration. These initial findings from the pooled OLS analysis for 
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both dependent variables point to the need for further investigation using HLM methods, 
taking into account the longitudinal and nested structure of the data. 
However, several other statistically significant control variable relationships were 
demonstrated in the pooled OLS model, including Pell, Carnegie_Research, 
Carnegie_Masters, SATMATH75, Tuition, Faculty, Unemployment, and Income. While 
statistical significance is observed for these control variables, substantively the results are 
of only limited value. However, the relationship and significance of the control variable 
Faculty with Completion is in fact meaningful. Since the variables Faculty and 
Completion are both measured in percentage rates, the results show that with all other 
factors held constant, each percentage point increase in full-time faculty per FTE student 
is associated with a .30 percentage point increase in Completion rate.  
The practical significance of this result can be seen by considering the range of 
values for Faculty: since values within two standard deviations of the mean for Faculty 
range from 1.97 percent to 7.17 percent, the range of values for Faculty could produce 
between a .30 and 1.55 percentage point increase for approximately 95.45 percent of the 
values of Completion. Although this result does not directly impact the research 
hypotheses addressed by this study, this preliminary finding represents a potentially 
important direction for further research. Because of this, the relationship between Faculty 
and Completion will be examined further in the HLM analysis below, so that these 
institution-level effects can be further investigated. 
In summary, the results from the pooled OLS regression have provided initial 
insight into the behavior of the independent and dependent variables without regard to the 
longitudinal and hierarchical nature of the dataset. The next step in this study’s analytical 
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strategy was to determine whether Completion and Retention exhibited variance among 
groups, taking into consideration the hierarchical structure of the data. Based on an 
evaluation of the appropriateness of this strategy using the results of the ICC statistic in 
the unconditional model, the full three-level hierarchical model was evaluated. An 
interpretation of the results of this analysis is presented below. 
Three-Level Hierarchical Linear Regression Model 
 
This section presents the results of the evaluation of HLM models for both 
Completion and Retention. Prior to evaluating the HLM models, it was necessary to 
determine whether variability exists among regressors at each level of the hierarchical 
model (Shin 2003, 102). Evaluating the unconditional model serves two primary 
purposes in this regard: first, it allows for the decomposition of level-specific variance 
components (Hox 2010, 15), providing insight into the proportion of variation accounted 
for by each grouping level. Second, as Hox states, evaluating the unconditional model 
“serves as a benchmark with which other models are compared” (16). This provided a 
basis for comparison of the full HLM model, in order to account for the relative 
improvement of the addition of independent and control variables. The following sections 
establish this benchmark through the analysis of intercept-only models for Completion 
and Retention.  
Intraclass Correlation (ICC). Calculating the likelihood ratio (LR) statistic for the 
unconditional HLM model provided a means to test the null hypothesis that there is no 
variance among groups (Hox 2010, 47). If there were no basis to reject this null 
hypothesis, then the use of HLM analysis would not be warranted. However, in this case 
the p-value of the test statistic was 0, so the null hypothesis was in fact rejected. As a 
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result, this analysis indicates that there is intraclass variance among groups, and for this 
reason the full HLM model will be evaluated. Table 4 outlines the ICC analysis results 
for the unconditional model for Completion, which is used in order to estimate relative 
levels of correlation within each level of analysis (Hox 2010, 14).  
Table 4: Unconditional Model Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for Completion 
Level ICC (Std. Error) 
State Level .12 (.04) 
Institution Level .84 (.01) 
 
Table 4 reveals a key insight into the distribution of variance among levels in the 
IPEDS data for Completion. Specifically, the correlation of institutions within states 
(level two) is high, at .84. This is interpreted to mean that approximately 84 percent of 
variance of Completion is explained at level two, by the grouping of institutions within 
states (Hox 2010, 15-17). Furthermore, the variance of Completion at the state level 
(level three) is much lower, at approximately 12 percent. Identifying the partitioned 
variance at each level is a key benefit of HLM analysis, and the potential implications of 
this variance distribution will be discussed further in Chapter 5 in the interpretation of 
results. 
As with the unconditional Completion model above, the results of the likelihood 
ratio test for Retention rejected the null hypothesis that there is no variance among 
groups. Therefore, the full HLM model for Retention will be evaluated. An evaluation of 
the ICC components for the unconditional Retention model produced the following 
results shown in Table 5: 
Table 5: Unconditional Model Intraclass Correlation (ICC) for Retention 
Level ICC (Std. Error) 
State Level .18 (.04) 
Institution Level .78 (.01) 
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Based on the ICC level-specific components in Table 5, the correlation of 
institutions within states (level two) is high, at .78. That is, approximately 78 percent of 
the variance of Retention among institutions can be explained by their grouping within 
states (Hox 2010, 15). The intraclass correlation among states at level three is much 
lower, at .18, so approximately 18 percent of the variance can be explained at the state 
level. Considering the results of both the Completion and Retention ICC analysis together 
allows a picture of the relative significance of institution-level factors as a whole to 
become much clearer: these results show that for the two most commonly used measures 
of performance funding outcomes in colleges and universities from 2004 to 2010, 
institution-level factors accounted for over three-quarters of the partitioned variance.  
In summary, an analysis of pooled OLS models for the dependent variables 
Completion and Retention do not reveal meaningful relationships between the 
independent and dependent variables. Furthermore, an evaluation of the ICC components 
for Completion and Retention indicates that multilevel analysis is an appropriate means of 
gaining further insight into level-specific relationships, due to the distribution of variance 
between the group means at each level. In the following section, the results of the full 
HLM analyses for each dependent variable are presented. 
Results for the Full HLM Model for Completion 
 
 The results of the preliminary analyses presented above show the significant 
range of variance distribution among the levels in the full model. At this point, the full 
hierarchical linear model for the dependent variable Completion was conducted. Table 15 
in Appendix A displays the slopes and standard error results of the full HLM analysis for 
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the dependent variable Completion. The statistically significant results of this analysis are 
presented in this section. 
First, a very small, yet statistically significant, relationship between the variables 
Completion and Amount was exhibited in the results of the HLM analysis. Specifically, 
for each dollar increase in Amount, a resulting .00000108 percent change in Completion 
rate was observed, with all other factors held constant. Although this result is statistically 
significant, because of the effective upper limits of institutional funding levels found in 
the data, such a small change in Completion rate has no meaningful effect. Nevertheless, 
this finding is in fact highly significant with regard to its implications for policy 
legislation. Since state-level performance-based funding initiatives are implicitly built on 
the assumption that funding amounts do in fact impact outcomes, the fact that this study 
finds no meaningful statistical relationship among those factors certainly brings the 
underlying policy assumptions into question. The implications of this finding will be 
discussed further in Chapter 5. 
  Next, a number of institution-level variables were found to have statistically 
significant relationships with the dependent variables. The following statistically 
significant institution-level relationships were observed: with all other factors held 
constant, each percent increase in SATMATH75 produced only a .00004 percent increase 
in Completion. As with the independent variable Amount, the effective relationship of 
SATMATH75 on Completion is not meaningful within the range of data under evaluation. 
However, the findings with regard to the dependent variable Faculty do represent a 
meaningful relationship with the dependent variable: for each percent increase in Faculty, 
a resulting 1.58 percent increase in Completion is observed. While this result is not 
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directly related to the research hypotheses, it does represent a potentially significant 
direction for further research. 
  The following statistically significant relationships at the state level were 
observed: with all other factors held constant, each dollar increase in Income yields a 
.00000124 percent increase in Completion. Also, each percent increase in Minority 
resulted in a -.03 percent decrease in Completion. It is important to understand the 
controlling effects of socioeconomic factors such as these, and in particular the fact that 
neither Income nor Minority exhibited more than a slight association with Completion is a 
significant finding. Understanding the role of state-level socioeconomic factors is 
particularly important in light of the fact that, as discussed above, only 11.8 percent of the 
variance was explained at the state level for the HLM Completion model. These results 
point clearly to the fact that institution-level factors describe a much more substantial 
portion of the model than state-level factors. The additional insight gained by an 
evaluation of the state-level socioeconomic factors Income and Minority will provide 
context for an interpretation of these results in Chapter 5. 
  In addition to these institutional and state-level factors, the results of analysis for 
the dummy variables comprising the Carnegie Classification categories (shown in Table 
8 in Appendix A) reveal that for institutions categorized as Carnegie_Research, 
completion rates were .05 percent higher than for the reference category 
Carnegie_Bachelors. Also, for institutions categorized as Carnegie_Masters, completion 
rates were .04 percent higher than for Carnegie_Bachelors with all other factors held 
constant. While these factors exhibit moderate statistical significance, as with many other 
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factors in the full HLM model they demonstrate only very limited practical significance 
for the model as a whole. 
Proportion Reduction of Variance for the HLM Completion Model. Finally, in the HLM 
analysis for the dependent variable Completion, the addition of the control variables 
listed in Tables 15 and 16 in Appendix A produced a considerable reduction of variance 
in within-group means at each level. This was determined by comparing the random 
effects parameters of the unconditional model with the full model (Shin 2003, 128). 
Specifically, a 61.05 percent reduction in variance was produced at the observation level, 
a 70.54 percent reduction at the institutional level, and a 27.95 percent reduction at the 
state level. As Shin (2003) notes, one benefit of HLM analysis is “to improve the 
precision in parameter estimation” at each level of analysis (128). The substantial 
reduction in variance explained by the addition of control variables in this model 
illustrates the level of adequacy for the model as a whole. 
Results for the Full HLM Model for Retention. Table 16 in Appendix A presents the 
slopes and standard errors for the full HLM model for Retention. Based on the 
coefficients of the regressors selected for the full model, the following statistically 
significant institution-level relationships were observed: with all other factors held 
constant, for each dollar increase in Pell, a resulting .00002 percent decrease in Retention 
was observed. For each unit increase in SATMATH75, a resulting .0006 percent increase 
in Retention was observed. For each dollar increase in Tuition, a .00000044 percent 
increase in Retention was observed. While these results are statistically significant, 
because of the very small coefficient size of the regressors, the maximum range of 
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association with the dependent variable is extremely limited. In realistic terms, these 
factors can be said to have no practical significance for the dependent variable Retention. 
  In addition to the institution-level relationships, the following statistically 
significant state-level relationships were observed: with other factors held constant, for 
each dollar increase in Income, a .0000033 percent increase in Retention was observed, 
with all other factors held constant. As discussed in the results of the Completion model 
above, identifying such a small level of practical significance from the controlling effect 
of Income at the state level is in fact a valuable insight that will help to provide a better 
understanding of the landscape of institution-level and state-level factors as a whole. 
These issues, and their implications for performance-based funding policy 
implementation, will be discussed in Chapter 5 below.  
  The results of analysis for the Carnegie Classification category dummy variables 
in the Retention model reveal that for institutions categorized as Carnegie_Research, 
retention rates were .005 percent higher than for the reference category 
Carnegie_Bachelors. Also, retention rates for institutions categorized as 
Carnegie_Masters were .06 percent higher than for the reference category 
Carnegie_Bachelors, with all other factors held constant. This has an extremely small 
effect on the Retention model as a whole. 
Proportion Reduction of Variance for the HLM Retention Model. The significance of 
adding institution-level and state-level control variables at each level of the full HLM 
model for Retention was measured by determining the percent change of total variance 
between the unconditional and full models. As was observed for the dependent variable 
Completion above, a substantial reduction in variance was also observed at each level for 
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the Retention model, including an 11.64 percent reduction at the observation level, a 
76.67 percent reduction at the institution level, and a 65.53 percent reduction at the state 
level.  
Evaluation of Hypotheses 
The preceding section has presented the results of HLM analysis for the full 
models of both the Completion and Retention dependent variables. Regressors were 
selected based on an analysis of variance and ICC components, and slopes and standard 
error components were evaluated to determine the statistical significance of each variable 
in the full model at each level, with all other factors held constant. In addition, the 
proportion reduction of total variance was compared between the unconditional and full 
models at each level in order to determine the significance of incorporating institution-
level and state-level variables.  
Based on the results presented above, a determination can now be made for the 
evaluation of the null and alternative hypotheses for each pair of dependent and 
independent variables.  
I. Evaluation of Research Hypotheses for Amount and Completion 
Null Hypothesis (H0): Amount of performance funding at the state level is not 
associated with completion rate among U.S. four-year public universities. 
 
Alternative Hypothesis (H1): Amount of performance funding at the state level has 
a positive, statistically significant association with completion rate among U.S. 
four-year public universities. 
 
Although the evaluation of the relationship between Amount and Completion 
yields marginally significant results, because of the actual dollar limit of values for 
Amount in the IPEDS dataset, such a small change in Completion in fact has no 
meaningful significance. As Gelman and Stern (2006) observe, in some cases “statistical 
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significance is not the same as practical importance” (328). Thus, based on these findings 
the null hypothesis for Amount and Completion cannot be rejected. 
II. Evaluation of Research Hypotheses for Duration and Completion 
 
Null Hypothesis (H0): Duration of performance funding at the state level is not 
associated with completion rate among U.S. four-year public universities. 
 
Alternative Hypothesis (H1): Duration of performance funding at the state level 
has a positive, statistically significant association with completion rate among 
U.S. four-year public universities. 
 
Because Duration does not exhibit a statistically significant relationship with 
Completion in the full model, the null hypothesis for Duration and Completion cannot be 
rejected.   
III. Evaluation of Research Hypotheses for Amount and Retention 
Null Hypothesis (H0): Amount of performance funding at the state level is not 
associated with retention rate among U.S. four-year public universities. 
 
Alternative Hypothesis (H1): Amount of performance funding at the state level has 
a positive, statistically significant association with retention rate among U.S. 
four-year public universities. 
 
The independent variable Amount did not exhibit a statistically significant 
relationship with Retention in the full model. Therefore, on this basis the null hypothesis 
for Amount and Retention cannot be rejected. 
IV. Duration and Retention 
 
Null Hypothesis (H0): Duration of performance funding at the state level is not 
associated with retention rate among U.S. four-year public universities. 
 
Alternative Hypothesis (H1): Duration of performance funding at the state level 
has a positive, statistically significant association with retention rate among U.S. 
four-year public universities. 
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Duration did not exhibit a statistically significant relationship with Retention in 
the full model, and on this basis the null hypothesis for Duration and Completion cannot 
be rejected. 
In summary, no practical statistical significance was found between the two 
independent variables Amount or Duration and the two primary measures of performance 
outcomes in higher education, Completion and Retention. Because of this, these findings 
fail to reject the null hypotheses evaluated in this study. The results of the analysis of 
completion rate corroborate the findings of other primary studies conducted to date: Shin 
(2010) concludes that based on the factors of his study, “state characteristics …account 
for very little institutional performance” (63). Furthermore, based on the partitioning of 
variance presented in Chapter 4, this study agrees with the findings of Shin (2010, 63) 
and other studies suggesting that institution-level factors influence performance-based 
funding outcomes to a substantially greater degree than state-level factors. 
The findings of this study with regard to the independent variable Duration 
represent an original contribution to the literature, and they offer potentially significant 
insights into the behavior of performance-based higher education policy. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, studies such as Burke and Associates (2002), Dougherty and Hong (2006), and 
Harnisch (2011) have reviewed the number of years that various state performance 
funding policies have been in effect. In addition, Shin’s (2003) study of performance 
addresses policy duration by evaluating states with three or more years of sustained 
performance funding policy implementation, compared with those having less than three 
years. However, no other published study using longitudinal data in the research literature 
has evaluated performance-based funding using incremental years of policy duration as a 
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factor in state higher education effectiveness. Furthermore, in some studies such as 
Dougherty (2013, 62), the implicit assumption that funding duration contributes to 
outcomes increases has been made without adequate evidence or analysis. This study 
offers a corrective to this assumption in both research and policy implementation, as will 
be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
Table 7 in Appendix A illustrates the fact that relatively few states have 
experienced long-term duration of performance funding implementation. Approximately 
76 percent of the observations in the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project data had a Duration 
value of 0 years, and approximately 16 percent had a Duration value of one to ten years. 
Less than five percent of states had performance funding policies in effect for more than 
ten consecutive years at any time between 2004 and 2010. As states move into longer-
term periods in funding duration, the evaluation of additional data would contribute 
substantially to a better understanding of performance funding effectiveness.  
Although not directly related to the research hypotheses, several other institution-
level and state-level control variables in this study were found to be meaningfully 
associated with higher education outcomes measures, and these results can offer 
additional insight into the overall relationship between performance funding and 
outcomes. In particular, the highest level of statistical significance found among the 
variables considered in this study is the institution-level relationship between Faculty and 
Completion, representing full-time faculty per FTE student and completion rate. The 
results of HLM analysis show that each percentage increase in Faculty is associated with 
a 1.58 percent increase in Completion, with all other factors held constant. Based on the 
range of values for these variables in the IPEDS data between the years 2004 and 2010, 
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two standard deviations around the mean of Faculty (4.57 percent ± 1.30 percent) would 
yield a ± 4.11 percent change in Completion. This represents a potentially significant 
relationship with completion rates for public colleges and universities, and it points to the 
growing evidence in this study’s results that it was the inclusion of institution-level 
factors, to a much greater degree than state-level factors, that was associated with 
increases in completion and retention rates at public colleges and universities from 2004 
to 2010. 
An evaluation of the random effects components of the multilevel analyses in this 
study reinforces this finding: while variance at each level of analysis decreased 
significantly with the addition of institution-level and state-level control variables for 
both Completion and Retention, it was the addition of control variables at the institution 
level for each model that explained the greatest proportion of variance reduction. This 
finding points clearly to the fact that while performance funding initiatives across the 
U.S. have focused on rewarding state-level factors, colleges and universities would 
potentially benefit if funding policies focused more specifically on institution-level 
factors.  
These results point to the critical need for researchers to understand much more 
comprehensively the role and significance of institutional factors in performance-based 
higher education funding. For instance, the findings presented above illustrate the fact 
that full-time faculty per-student ratios were significantly associated with completion 
rates between 2004 and 2010. Interpreting this single finding from the perspective of state 
funding legislation necessitates a much more thorough understanding of the ways in 
which state funding currently impacts faculty hiring and retention, as well as the current 
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relationship between funding levels and enrollment. These insights point to meaningful 
directions for future research, with regard to both the formulation of policy at the 
legislative level and the implementation of these policies at the institutional level. These 
potential implications will be explored in further detail in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter V 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
This study has evaluated the relationship of performance-based funding amount 
and program duration with the institution-level and state-level outcomes of four-year 
public colleges and universities between 2004 and 2010. The findings presented in 
Chapter 4 identified only a small amount of statistically meaningful association between 
the independent variables Amount and Duration and the performance funding outcomes 
indicators measured by the dependent variables Completion and Retention. Based on 
these results, it was concluded that state level performance-based higher education 
funding has not exhibited a meaningful association with completion rates or retention 
rates in U.S. public colleges and universities.  
This chapter will interpret these results with specific attention to their 
implications for state-level and institution-level policy stakeholders, including higher 
education boards and university administrators. The findings presented in Chapter 4 
address a significant gap in the existing literature with regard to performance funding 
research in higher education. These findings can potentially be used in order to address 
current political trends in funding policy implementation among states nationwide, in 
addition to a range of other factors impacting policy implementation at the institutional 
level. Furthermore, the interpretation of these findings could serve as a resource to guide 
state legislators, as well as administrators in higher education institutions across the 
country. 
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Taken as a whole, this study’s findings contribute to the existing research 
literature in a way that helps to clarify the status of performance-based higher education 
funding in the United States. This research shows that current performance funding 
policies are not achieving desired results. However, there are indications of potential 
directions for greater policy effectiveness. These potential ways forward have critical 
implications both for policy development in states and for policy implementation in 
higher education institutions. Recommendations will be outlined for policymakers and 
institutional administrators based on these findings. In addition, several limitations with 
regard to the applicability of these results will be discussed, and directions for further 
research will be proposed. 
Applying the Results of Analysis: The Political Context 
 
For decades, a nationwide interest in improving student performance has driven 
the development of policies seeking to achieve more efficient, cost effective higher 
education delivery at the state level (Burke and Associates 2002, 2-5). Because higher 
education policy is a function of the states, progress toward these goals has taken shape in 
many different ways, and the specific forms that higher education delivery and funding 
have taken in the states have often been highly contested in the political arena. Because 
of this, opportunities for political action have often depended on politically expedient 
moments in which “streams” of political opportunity (Kingdon 1995, 123) have arisen in 
state legislatures. For this reason, factors such as the use of performance data, selection of 
outcomes indicators, and resulting funding policies have emerged not merely as neutral 
representations of student achievement, but as issues that are frequently wrapped in the 
rhetoric of political actors within states (Moynihan 2008, 193-195). 
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With this political backdrop in mind, an increasingly complex relationship 
between funding and higher education accountability has developed throughout the 
decades, and the continued process of research and debate has taken shape within the 
context of issues including performance accountability and academic freedom (Dumont 
1980, 412-413); accountability and program efficiency (Burke and Associates 2002, 2-5); 
cost structure, price and productivity analysis (Cohn, et al. 1989, 284); and the multi-
product character of higher education output (Paulsen and Smart 2001, 162). The 
research literature shows that these trends have often had quite significant implications 
for the development of higher education policy. For instance, because economic drivers 
play a primary role in the development of education policy, the high degree of emphasis 
in recent decades upon program efficiency has resulted in the reinterpretation of 
academic outcomes using “economic vocabularies” (Barnetson and Cutright 2000, 288-
290). This has often resulted in the misalignment of state goals with institution-level 
mission. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Harnisch (2011) addresses the fact that economic 
incentives inherently distort institutional motivations, encouraging or facilitating certain 
behaviors while dissuading others (2011, 7-8). Because of the impact this can have on the 
methods by which policy is evaluated and implemented, it is important to interpret this 
study’s findings with regard to Completion and Retention in this light. 
Implications of Independent Variable Analysis 
 
Although performance-based funding policies in many states have been 
developed with the intent to preserve institution-specific missions by translating them 
into elaborate funding formulae, these efforts often risk further distorting these goals as 
academic missions are viewed through political and economic lenses (Harnisch 2011, 7-
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8). Ultimately, the research literature shows that the structure of performance-based 
funding policies depends on the characteristics of the linkages between funding and 
outcomes. The fact that funding amount was not found to have a meaningful association 
with completion rate or retention rate means that either additional linkages must be 
incorporated into the existing state-level funding polices, or else alternative funding 
strategies must be established. These implications have significance for state legislators, 
higher education governing boards, and institutional administrators, and they will be 
explored in detail in this chapter.  
As Burke and Minassians (2003) have observed, the success of funding policy not 
only depends on the establishment of legislation at the state level, but also on the ability 
of an institution to communicate policy expectations to its stakeholders within the 
organization. In addition to this, successful implementation requires the institution to 
convey the purpose of the policy and to set standards for internal completion and 
accountability for the execution of policy (Burke and Minassians 2003, 20). As Shin and 
Milton’s (2004) findings make clear, because institutions depend on complex, 
interconnected systems of accountability, effective performance funding depends on 
successful communication and implementation at every level (Shin and Milton 2004, 16-
17).  
This study’s findings with regard to faculty-student ratio are particularly 
significant in this light. The implications of the Retention outcomes of this study are 
indicative of the issues of mission and resource misalignment at the institutional level. No 
significant association was found between performance funding amount and retention 
rate, nor between program duration and retention rate. Interpreting this finding requires a 
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careful understanding of the extensive student retention research literature, and it 
certainly opens the door for a host of further research questions related to the role of 
institutional factors.  
The work of Tinto (2006) is instructive in this regard. Tinto describes the progress 
made in retention research throughout the years, noting that in past decades, student 
persistence was first attributed primarily to individual traits such as motivation and 
individual academic skills (Tinto 2006, 2). However, subsequent studies revealed that in 
addition to these primarily “psychological” factors (4), the roles of academic and social 
environments were highly associated with persistence in the pre-college years and, in 
particular, in the critical first-year college experience (2-3). While all these factors were 
important, Tinto also notes that retention studies throughout the 1980s and 1990s offered 
further insight, identifying the role of faculty involvement in student retention (3-5).  
Clearly, a wide range of influences makes a difference in student retention, and 
key insights can be drawn from the historic pattern of retention research in the 
interpretation of this study’s results. While performance-based policy makes funding 
available for institutions based on outcomes that are linked to institutional objectives, this 
process clearly depends on the institution’s individual capacity to allocate and administer 
those funds based on its own highly specific institution-level context. The results of this 
study imply that colleges and universities are not accomplishing the work of directing 
funding effectively toward the institution-specific areas that make a difference for student 
retention.  
The implications of this study’s findings with regard to performance funding 
duration are equally significant. The results of HLM analysis revealed that the 
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independent variable Duration had no statistically significant associations with the two 
most commonly held outcomes measures of public university systems.  That is, in states 
that implemented performance funding policies, even when the initiatives were given 
longer periods of sustained implementation, no increased significance for college 
completion rate or retention rate was observed. These findings have potentially 
significant implications for researchers and policymakers, in particular because they 
corroborate the relatively small number of studies in the research literature that have 
addressed the role of policy duration in higher education funding research. Specifically, 
they confirm the research of Shin (2010), whose HLM analysis evaluated graduation 
rates and research funding levels as dependent variables. Shin concluded that the duration 
of performance funding program made no difference in graduation rate (59).  
The findings with regard to funding duration have particularly significant 
implications for higher education policy, precisely because state-level performance 
funding initiatives have historically been built upon the assumption that policy duration 
does impact outcomes. In fact, the literature suggests that even in studies in which these 
initiatives were determined not to exhibit a statistically significant association with 
outcomes, the role of sustained program duration is still often presumed to be a 
meaningful factor in increasing funding effectiveness. For instance, although Shin and 
Milton (2004) concluded that graduation rates were not associated with the presence of 
performance-based funding between 1997 and 2001 in four-year institutions in the United 
States, their project summary included the recommendation that “[p]olicy-makers are 
advised to sustain [performance-based funding] programs long enough until such 
programs bear their fruits or are proven ineffective” (Shin and Milton 2004, 1-2). 
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Additionally, Dougherty and Hong (2006) observed the general presence of “funding 
instability” (72) as an obstacle to achieving the objectives of performance funding in the 
six states they studied, implying that a more stable, sustained duration could have 
promoted outcomes achievement. Dougherty and Reddy (2013) also make the following 
claim: “Many performance funding programs do not last for many years, thus 
undercutting their capacity to produce effects” (62).  
Clearly, this study’s findings challenge the underlying assumption that additional 
years of performance funding can add to a “capacity to produce effects” (Dougherty and 
Reddy 2013, 62), at least with performance funding policies as they are currently 
implemented. However, it should be noted that because many states have recently 
launched performance-based funding policies, additional years of data are in fact needed 
to evaluate fully the significance of these programs. As shown in Table 7 in Appendix A, 
less than five percent of states have had more than ten consecutive years of higher 
education performance funding policies in effect at any time in the IPEDS data between 
2004 and 2010, and in many cases, states are only in the first or second years of program 
implementation. Therefore, it is the recommendation of this study that additional 
longitudinal years of data should be evaluated in a follow-up study, in order to evaluate 
new state programs after additional values for Duration are added. 
In addition to the implications outlined for the independent variables, some 
statistically significant relationships among institution-level and state-level control 
variables were identified as well. However, the results of the full HLM model show that 
these control variables generally contributed to the model only minimally. In fact, the 
only institution-level factor found to have a meaningful association with completion rate 
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was faculty-student ratio. The implications of this finding will be discussed further 
below. While other institution-level and state-level variables were found to be statistically 
significant, their practical significance given the range of values found in the data was not 
found to be meaningful. 
Implications of Control Variable Analysis 
 
What can be learned from the very limited relationship that was identified 
between funding and institutional outcomes? In general, these findings are consistent 
with recent research literature that has addressed factors associated with student retention 
rate, as outlined from Tinto (2006) above. The trends exhibited in retention rate research 
throughout the years are particularly instructive in the context of this study’s findings. As 
Tinto (2006) makes clear, many student achievement outcomes that were once thought to 
be attributable to factors outside the institution have subsequently been found, through 
the examination of longitudinal data, to be more closely related to institution-level factors 
within the university’s administrative structure (2-5). This pattern of refining research 
trends by examining institutional factors more closely corroborates the findings of this 
study. Clearly, state-level goals ultimately require more effective institution-level 
implementation. 
Furthermore, although this study has incorporated a relatively wide range of 
socioeconomic factors that were selected based on a review of the research literature, it is 
the case that incorporating additional factors could offer further insights. In fact, the 
primary implication of this study’s evaluation of socioeconomic controls is to clarify 
what does not make a significant difference in performance funding. Because such 
factors such as average salary, minority percentage, average state tax revenue, and 
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unemployment rate are not associated with funding success, further research is needed 
that focuses on identifying additional factors that can potentially lead to the development 
of more effective funding policies.  
In addition to the insights that have been gained from an evaluation of the 
independent and control variables in the multilevel model, the partitioned variance levels 
presented in Chapter 4 further demonstrate the importance of institution-level 
characteristics, as compared to the less significant role of state-level factors. This study 
found that for both the Completion and Retention models, the incorporation of institution-
level factors in the full HLM models accounted for the greatest amount of variance 
reduction: approximately 70.54 percent in the Completion model, and 76.67 percent in 
the Retention model. Even though a number of institution-level factors did not 
demonstrate meaningful relationships with student outcomes, the proportion of variance 
distribution at the institution-level reinforces the relative significance of these factors in 
the hierarchical model.  
The importance of the individual institution in performance funding success is 
brought into particular focus through this study’s findings with regard to faculty-student 
ratio. Interestingly, the research literature addressing the significance of faculty-student 
ratio and class sizes upon student outcomes is surprisingly mixed. For instance, Kennedy 
and Siegfried (1997) found that class size was not associated with student achievement 
on the Test of Achievement in College Economics (TUCE) (Kennedy and Siegfried 
1997, 390-392). However, Johnson (2010) noted that research results throughout the past 
several decades have depended greatly on the type of data and methodological approach 
that was used. Johnson’s HLM analysis of students in 2,200 undergraduate sections 
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(Johnson 2010, 705) identifies the significance of faculty-student ratio for final grades, 
controlling for “student characteristics, class level, and random effects” (721). Johnson 
found that increases in faculty-student ratio at the class level were associated most 
strongly with grade increases for small classes. These increases were much less closely 
related in already-large classes (721-722). Johnson’s research is consistent with the 
findings of this study, which revealed a relatively significant, positive relationship 
between faculty-student ratio and completion rate, with all other factors held constant. 
Although this finding does not directly address this study’s research hypotheses, it 
certainly reinforces the larger implications of this study with regard to the overarching 
importance of factors at the institution level. Clearly, the role of university faculty in the 
overall success of students is critically important, and the degree of faculty interaction 
also has a significant effect on overall institutional measures of success (Johnson 2010, 
721-722). This insight should inform the development of funding policy by emphasizing 
the importance of such issues as faculty hiring, salaries, course size management, and a 
host of other issues at the institutional level. The specific implications of this finding will 
be discussed further below.  
The use of HLM analysis in this study has provided key insights into the 
importance of factors at the institutional level, and this has led to the identification of 
potential improvements that can be made as funding policy aligns more closely with 
meaningful factors on this level. It is clear that in the current landscape of state funding 
policy, states have not implemented policies that can make a difference for higher 
education outcomes. Because of this, not only are taxpayer resources going to waste, but 
students are failing to achieve their potential due to factors that could include both 
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ineffective allocation of funds at the state level and ineffective administration of these 
funds at the university level. Higher education budget policy must become more strategic 
and better focused on the institution, and it must build upon continued advances made in 
funding policy research as additional research takes place.  
At this point, the two primary trends that are clearly exhibited throughout the 
sections above can be summarized as follows: first, performance-based funding policies 
in four-year public institutions across the U.S. from 2004 to 2010 have not proven to be 
effective in improving university completion rates or retention rates. Second, evaluating 
the multilevel structure of the IPEDS data reveals that on a proportional basis, institution-
level factors are associated with a much higher percentage of outcomes increases than 
state-level factors. Based on these results, the implications are clear: performance-based 
funding cannot continue in its current form. Because of this, based on the findings 
presented in this study and the trends identified in the literature, several specific actions 
are recommended around the critical areas of research and implementation. These 
recommendations will be outlined in the section to follow. 
Recommendations 
 
Accomplishing state-level goals in higher education must involve a commitment 
to clarify objectives, measure and assess progress, and make decisions to preserve, 
modify, or remove policies based on the evidence obtained through research. In this light, 
this study offers several specific recommendations for state legislatures, higher education 
boards, and institutional administrators. Each recommendation outlines one or more 
specific actions to be addressed by a particular constituency, based on the findings of this 
study. These recommendations require stakeholders above all to be committed to engage 
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in the pursuit of a more comprehensive understanding of the data associated with higher 
education outcomes, as well as a much greater level of communication with institutions 
in order to strengthen the meaningful linkages between policy and implementation. This 
study’s results make clear that it is the institutional level at which these linkages have the 
greatest potential significance, and these recommendations are focused in detail on that 
level.  
1. Further Research is Necessary to Enhance State-Level Funding Models. Current 
studies in performance-based funding have generally evaluated a selected set of factors 
representing the most frequently used institutional outcomes measures (Shin and Milton 
2004, 4). Although HLM analysis has offered additional insights into level-specific 
behavior, few studies have explored individual state-level funding models in detail. If 
progress is to be made in evaluating the long-term sustainability of individual state-level 
programs, states must first develop more effective ways to understand the behavior and 
effectiveness of their own funding models.  
In this light, this study’s findings build on the results that were found with 
faculty-student ratio, which exhibited a significant relationship with completion rate in 
states that implemented performance-based funding between 2004 and 2010. State higher 
education boards must leverage insights such as these as a starting point for further 
research. As mentioned above, the research literature shows that faculty-student ratio and 
class have been shown to be associated with higher education student outcomes (Johnson 
2010, 721); however, findings are mixed with regard to the scope of impact, and results 
have depended in part on analytic strategy and data sources used (705). For this reason, it 
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is critically important that additional research must be conducted, in order to shed 
additional light on the relative importance of institution-level factors such as these.  
The following specific actions are recommended for higher education governing 
boards in states that currently implement performance-based funding initiatives. First, 
boards must develop a meaningful benchmark of analysis, beginning with a workable 
means of assessing whether adequate data currently exist. In some cases, as quantifiable 
objectives are clarified in the process of developing mission-based funding goals, it could 
become clear that sufficient data are not being collected for adequate measurement. In 
those cases, higher education boards must obtain sufficient evaluative data either through 
outside data sources, or through the creation of additional data collection instruments 
(Adleman and Carey 2008, 27). Long-term evaluation of performance-funding 
effectiveness depends on consistent and effective measurement, and it also depends on 
the commitment of state boards to give the time and attention necessary for the selection 
of the most appropriate outcomes indicators. 
This study also recommends that state higher education boards task 
subcommittees at the state level, as well as research faculty at the institutional level, in 
order to develop strategies for examining the significance of these factors in much greater 
detail. Because publicly available data are already collected through IPEDS and other 
surveys, state higher education boards could readily leverage these existing data in order 
to assist colleges and universities in aligning institutional mission with the factors 
selected for funding formulae. Where necessary, studies should be commissioned or 
incorporated into the existing priorities of higher education boards. Using these and other 
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means, states must develop more comprehensive evaluation tools to refine factor 
selection on a regular basis. 
Initiatives designed to improve funding research could take different forms 
depending on the structure of higher education boards and outcomes measurement in 
each state. As an example, the Tennessee Higher Education Commission currently 
maintains an Academic Affairs Division that is tasked with the administration of 
Tennessee’s performance-based funding programs (THEC 2014). In addition to the state-
level reporting and research the Division currently produces, it could also sponsor 
institution-level research through the development of publication opportunities, mini-
grant programs, or other means. This research would not only potentially enhance the 
state’s ability to refine funding formulae and budget decisions, but it would also help to 
equip universities in Tennessee with additional information that could assist in better 
aligning funding with institutional missions. 
2. Restructure Performance Funding Policies Where Appropriate. When states facilitate 
the processes that are necessary to evaluate funding policies more thoroughly, the 
resulting research will potentially uncover other institution-specific factors that can be 
incorporated into institutional funding formulae as well. However, based on the results of 
their analyses, states must be equally prepared to take the necessary steps to restructure 
and revise policies that have been shown to be ineffective. As discussed in Chapter 2, it 
was this initial commitment to improving the link between funding and outcomes that led 
to the development of the first performance-based programs. As Bogue and Brown 
(1982) observed in their early study of the Tennessee funding system, it had become 
increasingly clear that rewards based only on enrollment were inherently misaligned with 
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an institution’s purpose (Bogue and Brown 1982, 124). This commitment to evidence-
based funding policy decisions must remain the focus of each state. Once a clearer 
picture of successful factors in each state has been developed, states will be better 
equipped to make rational policy decisions about the long-term future of their programs. 
Based on the results of this and other studies, it is likely that many states should make 
significant modifications to the existing performance-based funding policies. The 
overarching issue in this regard is that policy decisions must be based on evidence gained 
from research, rather than merely upon political popularity or expediency. 
This recommendation is of particular significance for state legislators and higher 
education boards. As discussed in Chapter 2, legislative efforts behind performance-
based funding initiatives have often been driven by political motivations. Because of this, 
an evaluation of policy effectiveness risks being swayed by a motivation to maintain 
political popularity. In the long term, however, neither legislators nor institutions benefit 
from the failure to evaluate policy effectiveness honestly and carefully. If, after 
comprehensive analysis, state-level funding policies are not shown to improve 
performance, legislators and higher education governing boards must exhibit the 
confidence and courage to modify or, when necessary, cease such initiatives. Above all, 
such decisions must be made based on a thorough analysis of the data. 
State higher education governing boards can take guidance from the state of Ohio 
in this light. In the mid 1990s, recommendations from the newly-appointed Higher 
Education Funding Commission in Ohio (Burke and Associates 2002, 172) led to the 
development of an initial five-prong “performance challenge” program (172-173). 
Although this performance-based system initially suffered both from underfunding and 
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an overly complex design, Ohio was able to respond to design challenges by reframing 
and restructuring their approach (Burke and Associates 2002, 174). Success for Ohio’s 
funding programs has proven to be mixed, but additional restructuring has taken place in 
recent years with new initiatives beginning in 2014 (NCSL 2014). Throughout the years, 
Ohio has demonstrated a long-term commitment to the improvement and revision of 
funding programs based on the continual evaluation of data, and in this regard Ohio 
serves as a valuable example for other performance-based funding states. 
3. Improve Institutional Implementation Processes. Once institution-specific funding 
factors are selected and a process for policy refinement is ongoing, the results of this 
study imply that not only should the funding factors be carefully evaluated, but the 
underlying framework of policy implementation must also change. Specifically, 
institutions must work to improve their own internal administrative implementation and 
communication strategies at the institution level. As Rabovsky (2012) observes, the 
means by which funds are applied and managed at the institutional level have been 
addressed by only a few studies, and these have generally examined performance funding 
in higher education by focusing only on the direct association between funding and 
outcomes (679). Much less attention has been given in the literature to the “causal logic” 
that connects policy and implementation (679); however, it is clear that this intermediary 
level is critical. 
Rabovsky’s insight hinges on what he calls the “administrative response” 
(Rabovsky 2012, 679), and his analysis highlights the considerable amount of work still 
needed in order to understand the linkages between policy and outcomes in university 
funding formulae and other implementations of performance funding. Not only is the 
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relationship between performance funding levels and higher education outcomes limited, 
but in his words, in fact “we have very limited systematic analysis that can tell us why (or 
why not)” (Rabovsky 2012, 679). It is clearly this intermediary “administrative response” 
(679) that Rabovsky sees as the critical component of the internal response of the state 
university system. 
Rabovsky’s study also points to the need for a great deal of additional research 
with regard to missional differentiation (Rabovsky 2012, 697), administrative policy 
communication structures, and a number of other factors not addressed in this present 
study. In fact, Rabovsky brings up significant implications of the research of Crellin et al. 
(2011) and others, who observe the role of incentive and motivation when funding 
policies are changed in higher education. Crellin et al. note that when completions serve 
as a component of funding policy, institutional priorities are naturally shaped around 
serving this desired outcome (Crellin et al. 2011, 3). These issues of motivation and 
incentive offer insight into the ways in which states can potentially increase the 
effectiveness of program implementation. While this study considers a number of control 
variables addressing a relatively wide range of institutional level factors, much more 
extensive research is needed in order to understand the broader relationship of internal 
communication and administration of performance policy. 
This recommendation speaks directly to university presidents, administrators, and 
institutional governing boards. In 2003, Burke and Minassians noted that the “common 
and fatal flaw” of performance-based systems is “the failure to apply these programs to 
the internal academic units on campus…” (20). The findings of this study relate directly 
to their evaluation of policy application at the institutional level. Burke and Minassians’ 
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characterization of the effectiveness of performance-based systems based on their 
analysis of the Seventh SHEFO Survey is particularly telling: 
The anomaly of all three accountability programs—funding, budgeting, and 
reporting—is that they hold states, systems, and colleges and universities 
responsible for performance, but campus leaders do not apply that same 
responsibility to the internal divisions that are largely responsible for producing 
institutional results” (Burke and Minassians 2003, 20).   
 
This breakdown between the structure of accountability and the implementation of policy 
is a critical factor in higher education performance-based funding, and university 
presidents and other leaders should carefully consider the institutional assumptions that 
can influence the success of funding policy implementation. The work of Barnetson and 
Cutright offers further insight in this regard: when state higher education boards 
implement performance-based funding policies based only on end-level outcomes 
measures, they are in effect relying on the faulty logic that university systems are 
rationally-bounded operations that respond to clear cause-and-effect mechanisms 
(Barnetson and Cutright 2000, 288-290). However, quite the contrary is in fact true. The 
literature shows that too often, institutional administrators and stakeholders are ill 
equipped to implement effectively the practices mandated by legislators and governing 
boards, or to communicate effectively the purposes for which these policies are in effect.  
It is imperative that presidents and administrators commit the time and effort 
needed to examine how effectively funding policies are being communicated within the 
administrative levels of their institutions. This could include such efforts as “town hall” 
sessions among institutional faculty and staff, the specific incorporation of performance 
funding expectations into job descriptions and human resource training sessions, and 
incorporation of performance funding goals into the written institutional missions and 
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outcomes documents. Then, institutional stakeholders must take steps to develop more 
adequate procedures for implementation of these policies. One important strategy in this 
regard is the incorporation of department-level goals and outcomes factors. For instance, 
if the institutional funding formula includes specific completion rate goals, then 
individual academic departments should develop plans for measuring and maintaining 
appropriate department-level completion rates as well.  
 Hillman, Kelchen, and Goldrick-Rab (2013) point out the importance of 
developing clear mission-specific factors for performance funding implementation 
strategies. In their recommendations for funding policy implementation in the state of 
Wisconsin, they note that an individual institution’s funding structure must connect 
meaningfully with the “unique missions and markets” served by the institution (10), in 
order to maximize opportunities for success in implementation. When these highly 
relevant outcomes indicators are operationalized and incorporated into funding formulae, 
the “linkages” between funding and outcomes are strengthened. In this way, not only 
does the funding policy link appropriately with the most relevant performance outcomes 
measures, but the individual faculty, staff, and other stakeholders at the institutional level 
are themselves most closely aligned with the goals and objectives they are being asked to 
fulfill.  
Not only does the implementation of funding policy at the institution level involve 
successfully transmitting policy requirements and outcomes measures, but it must also 
involve a clear understanding at every administrative level of the alignment of outcomes 
measures with institutional mission. As Barnetson and Cutright (2000) have shown, this 
involves developing a consistent vocabulary of academic outcomes measurement across 
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institutional units. Barnetson and Cutright’s research shows that in some cases, the 
application of performance-based funding policies at the institution level applies the 
template of an economic vocabulary to academic outcomes (288-290). This has 
significant implications for institutions: in short, by quantifying the measurement of 
progress toward the academic mission, performance-based funding policy potentially 
changes the framework around which the mission is embodied at the institution level 
(Barnetson and Cutright 2000, 280). If the academic vocabulary of an institution’s 
mission is seemingly at odds with the economic vocabulary through which its objectives 
are translated, the result is a short-circuiting of the potential effectiveness of the funding 
policy. This iterative process of communication and implementation must be carefully 
implemented if funding policies are to achieve success. 
4. Redirect the Political Rhetoric. Burke and Associates (2002) observe that performance 
funding’s role for many states is often conceptual or rhetorical, rather than simply 
financial (267). The political rhetoric that is geared toward legislators, voters, and 
administrators regarding the effectiveness of performance funding policy must be 
carefully examined in light of this study. Whenever possible, legislators should make 
efforts to reclaim education issues from the partisan, rhetorical layers that often distort 
them. To achieve this, states must commit to focusing more closely on the evidence 
associated with outcomes measurement and evaluation in their individual state, rather 
than allow higher education issues to be determined merely by political expediency.  
State legislators can look to the state of Florida as an instructive example of the 
need to redirect higher education funding issues away from what often amounts to a 
contest of “political will” (Burke and Associates 2002, 158). Prior to 1998, Florida’s 
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State Board of Education had “little influence on higher education funding policies and 
outcomes” (Burke and Associates 2002, 139-140). Although a number of higher 
education accountability requirements and performance initiatives had been attempted in 
Florida prior to this time, including the Government Performance and Accountability Act 
in 1994 (141), Burke and Associates noted that it was in part “[t]he divided nature of 
state government and academic governance in Florida” that hampered the implementation 
of this initiative (142). Political compromise in 1996 (146), followed by a structural 
change in state legislative authority in 1998 (139), opened the way for higher education 
priorities to escape the cycle of political struggle. 
As Barnetson and Cutright (2000) observe, although funding policy is inherently 
political, it is often implemented based on the misplaced assumption that outcomes 
indicators are neutral and objective in their definition and content. In fact, their research 
refutes prevailing assumptions that performance indicators can serve as objective 
standards at all. On the contrary, they argue that the implicit assumptions embedded in 
the application of performance indicators (particularly those that are tied to incentives) 
(286-287) often act as “conceptual technologies” (280) that shape both the content and 
approach of policy (277; 280). Barnetson and Cutright illustrate their argument by noting 
that performance outcomes indicators are, by definition, “policy instruments (i.e., tools 
that propel institutions and/or individuals to act when otherwise they could not or would 
not”) (Barnetson and Cutright 2000, 279).  
Because in many cases the “agenda” (Barnetson and Cutright 2000, 279-280) of 
performance indicators is perceived as an external tool of manipulation driven primarily 
by financial incentives, an inherent disconnect is too often created between institutional 
100 
 
administrators and the academic community upon which policies are implemented 
(Barnetson and Cutright 2000, 280-281). Even though many states claim to have created 
performance-based funding policies that incorporate institutional mission, the work of 
Barnetson and Cutright shows how implementing performance-based policies can 
potentially “confus[e] accountability with regulation” (289). For this reason, institutional 
administrators must work to identify situations in which this disconnect might be 
derailing the potential for implementing funding initiatives, and when possible overcome 
these situations by developing clearer lines of communication with policy stakeholders.  
Fundamentally, all four recommendations presented above are based on the 
mounting evidence in the literature and in this study that what institutions do with 
funding is more important than the amount of funds themselves. A primary question at 
the policy level, therefore, is how best to structure the funding programs at the state level 
so that institutions are equipped for success based on proven institution-level outcomes 
drivers, while also maintaining autonomy in fund management and mission-directed 
focus. Translating performance-based funding from simply external economic mandates 
into policies that are clearly connected with the goals of the academic community will 
improve the shared mission of institutions and states. In order to accomplish this, a 
greater strategic use of financial and political capital should be directed toward 
institution-level communication, training, and assistance with policy implementation.  
As this study has shown, the failure of many performance-based funding policies 
to produce effective change in institutional outcomes clearly demands a substantive 
response. States implementing performance-based funding polices must first clarify the 
factors that are not associated with outcomes increases, as shown in this study and in the 
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research literature. Second, states must be ready to refocus and reshape ineffective 
funding policies based on the results of the growing research in this field including this 
and other studies. Third, for states that continue to implement performance-based funding 
policy based on this additional research, it is critically important that university 
administrators, faculty, and other stakeholders become engaged in a more effective 
framework of communication and implementation. The specific shape of these 
communicative frameworks will of course depend heavily upon the missions of each 
individual institution. Based on the institution-level results of this study, it is 
recommended that the institutional mission should be the overriding focus of the 
communicative framework.  
Limitations of Applicability and Directions for Further Research 
 
As mentioned in the introductory comments, the conceptual framework for this 
study has been built around the question of effectiveness. The review of the literature in 
Chapter 2 makes clear that, despite the implementation of a wide range of funding 
approaches in many states throughout the years, research has so far shown no meaningful 
state-level association between performance funding policy and the most common higher 
education outcomes measures. State higher education funding policies are still plagued by 
policy ambiguity, and policy effectiveness is hampered by a number of factors including 
continued inefficiencies, unintended impact upon the financial and human resources of 
institutions (Dougherty and Reddy 2013, 71-77), and lack of public transparency in the 
financial operations of public universities.  
While this study addressed the overarching issue of policy effectiveness at the 
institution and state levels, the applicability of this study’s results is limited in a number 
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of ways. This study evaluated the significance of performance-based funding policy as 
measured by dollar amount per year (Amount) and consecutive years of implementation 
(Duration). As such, while this study specifically addresses research questions that 
evaluate the presence of state-level performance funding policy, it did not differentiate 
among the variety of ways in which both states and institutions implement policies. 
As an example, this study did not differentiate between funding policies that 
incorporate percentage-based increases into institution-level funding formulas, and 
polices that allocate funding as a separate bonus (Dougherty and Reddy 2013, 80-81). 
While both forms of performance funding allocate dollars based on the achievement of 
outcomes criteria, many important differences exist between the two models, and these 
could impact decision-making processes at the institutional level. For instance, if funding 
dollars are allocated to institutions as a bonus, institutional budget managers might be 
more likely to plan expenditures around the predicted baseline allocation, and reserve 
bonus funding for special projects or contingency spending. Because this study only 
identifies the presence of performance funding policy (but not its specific characteristics), 
further research is needed in this area. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 2, higher education performance funding 
policy takes shape within complex political landscapes. This study did not incorporate 
political data into its analysis; however, these issues are important areas for further 
research, and readily available data from a number of publicly available sources could be 
incorporated into future studies. For example, although this study does not control for the 
distribution of state legislators or governors by political party, historical data for state 
legislative political membership are available through the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
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Statistical Abstract of the United States (U.S. Census Bureau 2012). These data could be 
incorporated into existing longitudinal datasets including the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project 
Database. In addition, Burke and Associates (2002) note that state gubernatorial elections 
can often result in new political priorities emerging in the midst of funding 
implementation (179; 197). Furthermore, structural political factors such as state 
legislative arrangement, type of budget approval process, and many others are potentially 
significant for the development of funding policy, and these should be carefully 
considered as well.  
Just as the wide variation in state-level policy limits the applicability of this study, 
the range of institutional implementation models further limits the direct application of 
these results as well. Dougherty and Reddy (2013) have cited limited research to-date 
showing evidence that funding policy is likely to demonstrate a significant association 
with an institution’s organizational structure, capacity for research, and other 
characteristics of the institution as it responds to external outcomes incentives 
(Dougherty and Reddy 2013, 41-43, from Kastner 2000, 31; 35). Because the specific 
forms of institution-level policy implementation are widely varied, the applicability of 
this study’s results is limited as a result. Clearly, further institution-level research is 
needed with regard to factors including policy awareness, buy-in, clear communication of 
objectives and incentives, reliable measurement of objectives, reliable data reporting, and 
many others. 
In addition, this study was limited to the years 2004 to 2010 due to the availability 
of IPEDS: Delta Cost Project data. As discussed in Chapter 1, a number of variables 
evaluated in this study were not available in IPEDS reporting prior to 2003 (NCES 
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2013a). Also, since additional data were incorporated from a number of sources including 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Bureau of Economic Analysis, the longitudinal scope 
of this combined dataset was limited by the availability of historical data from these 
sources. In particular, state-level program duration data were obtained through the 
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL 2013), which compiles policy 
initiatives reported by individual states. For many states in this data source, availability of 
historic funding policy data was limited. 
A number of new performance-based initiatives have been implemented at the 
state level since 2010, and an evaluation of these recent projects is beyond the scope of 
this study. Because limited outcomes data are available for these initiatives at this point, 
additional analysis will be needed as new data become available (Dougherty and Reddy 
2013, 80-81). In addition, while this study evaluates a wide range of socioeconomic 
control variables, a much greater diversity of state-level policy detail and implementation 
exists. Further research that examines individual state-level policies with specific 
attention to each state’s individual economic policy factors could offer much greater 
insights in this regard. In Chapter 2, the research literature that addresses the political 
context of state-level performance funding policy was discussed briefly. However, a 
comprehensive examination of political factors was beyond the scope of this research. 
Although this study controls for economic factors such as tax revenue, personal income, 
and unemployment rate, it does not control for any other state-level economic policies, 
incentives, or financial burdens that might also be associated with institutional outcomes 
at the same time that performance-funding policies are in effect (Dougherty and Reddy 
2013, 81). Depending on the nature of these policies, their effects could potentially either 
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amplify or negate the significance of performance-based funding. As such, the 
applicability of this study’s results is limited in this regard, and further research in this 
area is needed.  
Summary 
 
In “Opportunity Adrift: Flagship Universities are Straying from Their Public 
Mission” (Haycock, Lynch, and Engle 2010), the Education Trust’s analysis of spending 
patterns among flagship public universities shows that financial aid is being allocated in a 
manner that has increasingly steered away from the “historic mission” of public 
education (2-4). Because the immense growth of public higher education has taken shape 
within the complex fiscal landscape of state budget policy, university systems 
unfortunately depend on funding policies that are not always well aligned with academic 
mission (Harnisch 2011, 8; Barnetson and Cutright 2000, 288-290). In some cases, state 
legislators have championed funding policies for reasons of political opportunity or 
expediency (Kingdon 1995, 90; 123), and too often, institutional and state policy 
priorities become further misaligned when funding policies serve merely to justify 
political aims or prioritize fiscal savings (Haycock, Lynch, and Engle 2010, 5-6). Even 
when funding policies do align with university missions, in many cases the successful 
implementation of these policies at the institutional level remains lacking (Burke and 
Minassians 2003, 20). The increasingly complex relationship between institutions and 
state policy initiatives has, as Rhoten and Calhoun (2009) point out, made it ever more 
challenging for universities to “provide a clear account of their purposes—to themselves 
as well as to others” (26). 
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Within this complex funding landscape, performance-based funding initiatives 
have emerged in recent decades as a way to achieve increased accountability and 
efficiency in reaching outcomes, while also offering the potential to increase 
accountability and financial transparency. Although performance-based funding 
initiatives have many advocates at the federal and state levels, the complex relationship 
between institutional priorities and state policy has so far led to mixed success. This 
study has sought to contribute to the research literature by evaluating the association of 
funding amount and program duration with completion rates and retention rates from 
2004 to 2010. Although public university outcomes were not found to be significantly 
associated with performance funding policy amount and duration, some implications for 
institution-level factors do point to a way forward. In particular, multilevel analysis has 
revealed that potential opportunities exist at the institution level where factors such as 
faculty-student ratio can be leveraged. Ongoing research in this field must address these 
issues carefully, and with greater attention to the institution-level factors that can be 
emphasized in the refinement of funding policies. 
At root, these results highlight the continued importance of the individual 
institution both in identifying factors relating most clearly to institutional mission, and in 
shaping its academic and administrative structures in a way that can best communicate 
policy effectiveness. Whatever form funding policies take in individual states—whether 
performance-based or otherwise—their formation and implementation must depend on a 
clear evaluation of the evidence. Policymakers and institutional stakeholders must always 
remain open to adapting and refining these policies as new factors and missions grow and 
change. In the end, these funding initiatives must remain focused above all on the goal of 
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identifying the most fiscally responsible and effective means to promote the achievement 
of outcomes, while also preserving academic integrity and free inquiry (Calhoun 2009, 
902-905). This will truly mean the difference in our ability to serve those students who 
represent the next generation of thinkers and leaders.  
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APPENDIX A: 
Tables 6-16 
 
Table 6: Definitions and Descriptions of Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables 
 Description 
Dependent Variables  
Retention Percentage of FTE enrolled students who returned the 
following year (NCES 2013a) 
Completion Ratio of total student completions at each institution, divided 
by total full-time-equivalent (FTE) enrollment per year 
(NCES 2013a) 
Independent Variables  
Amount Dollar amount of state-level appropriations per FTE student, 
measured in 2010 HEPI-adjusted dollars 
Duration1 Duration of performance funding implementation, measured 
in years 
Institution-Level Control Variables 
Pell Average Pell Grant per FTE Student 
Carnegie_Research Dummy Variable = 1 if Carnegie 2005 Classification value is 
15, 16 or 17 
Carnegie_Masters Dummy Variables = 1 if Carnegie 2005 Classification value 
is 18, 19, or 20 
Carnegie_Bachelors Dummy Variable = 1 if Carnegie 2005 Classification value is 
21, 22, or 23 
SATMATH75 Student SAT I Math scores at the 75th percentile 
Tuition In-state tuition and fees per FTE student 
Faculty Average number of full-time instructional faculty per FTE 
student 
Minority Percent student body minority enrollment based on IPEDS 
data 
State-Level Control Variables 
Unemployment2 Unemployment rate by state, per year 
Income3 Average personal income by state, per year 
Tax4 Per capita tax revenue by state, per year 
Statenum State number (integer value) 
Note. Values are derived from the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database (NCES 2013a) unless otherwise 
indicated. 
1Source: National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL, “State Activity”, February 2013) 
2Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 2013). 
3Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA 2013). 
4Source: Urban Institute-Brookings Institution (Tax Policy Center 2013). 
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Table 7: Number of Consecutive Years of Funding Duration per State, per Year in the 
IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database, 2004-2010  
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Alabama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Alaska 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arizona 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Arkansas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
California 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Colorado 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Connecticut 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Delaware 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Florida 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Georgia 0 0 1 2 3 0 0 
Hawaii 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Idaho 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Illinois 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Indiana 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 
Iowa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kansas 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Kentucky 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 
Louisiana 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 
Maine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maryland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Massachusetts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Michigan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Minnesota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mississippi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Missouri 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Montana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nebraska 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nevada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New 
Hampshire 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Jersey 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Mexico 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
New York 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N. Carolina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
N. Dakota 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ohio 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Oklahoma 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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Oregon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pennsylvania 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Rhode Island 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S. Carolina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S. Dakota 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Tennessee 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
Texas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Utah 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vermont 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Washington 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
West Virginia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wisconsin 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wyoming 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL, “State Activity”, February 2013). 
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Table 8: Categorization of Carnegie Classification Dummy Variables with Descriptions 
and Percentages 
Variable Description Percent 
Carnegie_Research Carnegie = 15, 16 and 17 152 out of 482 
(31.5%) 
Carnegie_Masters Carnegie = 18, 19 and 20 234 out of 482 
(48.5%) 
Carnegie_Bachelors Carnegie = 21, 22 and 23 96 out of 482 
(20.0%) 
 
Table 9: Collinearity Among Dependent, Independent, and Control Variables 
 Sq. Rt. (VIF) VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
Completion 1.49 1.22 .067 0.33 
Retention 2.22 1.49 0.45 0.55 
Amount 1.09 1.05 0.91 0.09 
Duration 1.07 1.03 0.94 0.06 
Tax 3.25 1.80 0.31 0.70 
Income 4.10 2.02 0.24 0.76 
Unemployment 1.36 1.17 0.74 0.26 
Minority 2.08 1.44 0.48 0.52 
Carnegie_Research 3.37 1.84 0.30 0.70 
Carnegie_Masters 2.52 1.59 0.40 0.60 
SATMATH75 8.60 2.93 0.12 0.88 
SATVERBAL75 8.49 2.91 0.12 0.88 
Tuition 1.29 1.14 0.77 0.23 
Faculty 1.15 1.07 0.87 0.13 
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Table 10: Means and Standard Deviations of Dependent, Independent, and Control 
Variables 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Dependent Variables   
Retention 0.73 0.12 
Completion 0.23 0.07 
Independent Variables   
Amount 1603.58 971.74 
Duration1 1.67 4.36 
Institution-Level Control Variables 
Pell 1074.95 600.74 
Carnegie_Research 0.32 0.46 
Carnegie_Masters 0.49 0.50 
Carnegie_Bachelors 0.20 0.40 
SATMATH75 583.62 60.75 
Tuition 5707.03 2199.58 
Faculty 0.05 0.01 
Minority 0.34 0.23 
State-Level Control Variables   
Unemployment2 6.15 2.24 
Income3 40294.77 5862.99 
Tax 4223.04 1046.36 
1 Source: National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL, “State Activity”, February 2013). 
2 Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 2013). 
3 Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA 2013).  
 
Table 11: Correlation Among Independent and Dependent Variables 
 Completion Retention Amount Duration 
Completion 1.00    
Retention 0.32 (.000)*** 1.00   
Amount -0.03 (.10) -0.02 (.31) 1.00  
Duration -0.004 (.04)* -0.01 (.44) 0.01 (.50) 1.00 
Note. N = 2,452 observations 
***p ≤ .001; **p ≤ .01; *p ≤ .05 
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Table 12: Comparison of Average Completion and Retention Rates in Performance Funding States vs. Non-Performance Funding 
States from 2004 to 2010  
Part I: Average Completion Rates in Percent per Year 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Avg. Change 
per Year 
States with Performance 
Funding 21.79 22.58 21.09 21.92 22.38 23.03 29.34 4.95% 
States without 
Performance Funding 23.09 23.48 23.91 24.07 24.45 24.01 23.79 0.43% 
All States 22.84 23.26 23.55 23.69 23.81 23.74 23.42 0.36% 
Part II: Average Retention Rates in Percent per Year 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Avg. Change 
per Year 
States with Performance 
Funding 68.05 70.53 70.50 72.25 69.56 68.94 71.71 0.77% 
States without Performance 
Funding 72.31 73.56 73.56 73.74 73.83 74.40 75.13 0.56% 
All States 70.63 72.96 72.85 72.93 72.90 73.43 74.22 0.73% 
Note. Values are derived from the IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database (NCES 2013a).
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Table 13: Pooled OLS Regression Results for Dependent Variable Completion 
 Coefficient (Std. Error) 
Intercept 0.03 (0.01)* 
Independent Variables  
Amount 0.0000034 (0.0000007)*** 
Duration -0.0003 (0.0002) 
Institution-Level Control Variables 
Pell -0.00001 (0.0000022)*** 
Carnegie_Research 0.04 (0.003)*** 
Carnegie_Masters 0.03 (0.002)*** 
SATMATH75 0.0002 (0.00002)*** 
Tuition -0.000002 (0.0000004)*** 
Faculty 0.30 (0.07)*** 
Minority -0.006 (0.005) 
State-Level Control Variables 
Unemployment 0.003 (0.0004)*** 
Income 0.000001 (0.0000002)*** 
Tax 0.000002 (0.00005) 
Note. N = 2,452 observations 
***p ≤ .001; **p ≤ .01; *p ≤. 05 
Adjusted R2 = 0.33 
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Table 14: Pooled OLS Regression Results for Dependent Variable Retention 
 Coefficient (Std. Error) 
Intercept 0.03 (0.03) 
Independent Variables  
Amount 0.0000009 (0.0000015) 
Duration -0.00002 (0.0003) 
Institution-Level Control Variables  
Pell -0.00005 (0.0000046)*** 
Carnegie_Research 0.003 (0.005)*** 
Carnegie_Masters 0.03 (0.004)*** 
SATMATH75 0.0009 (0.00004)*** 
Tuition 0.000002 (0.0000008)** 
Faculty 0.36 (0.14)** 
Minority 0.10 (0.009)*** 
State-Level Control Variables  
Unemployment 0.007 (0.0007)*** 
Income 0.000002 (0.0000005)*** 
Tax 0.000007 (0.000002)** 
Note. N = 2,452 observations 
***p ≤ .001; **p ≤ .01; *p ≤ .05 
Adjusted R2 = 0.55 
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Table 15: Full Model HLM Analysis for Dependent Variable Completion: Slopes and 
Standard Errors 
 Coefficient (Std. Error) 
Intercept .04 (.02) 
Independent Variables  
Amount 0.000001 (0.0000006)* 
Duration 0.0001 (0.0006) 
Institution-Level Control Variables  
Pell -0.000004 (0.000003) 
Carnegie_Research 0.05 (0.007)*** 
Carnegie_Masters 0.04 (0.006)*** 
SATMATH75 0.00004 (0.00002)* 
Tuition 0.000002 (0.000001) 
Faculty 1.58 (0.25)*** 
Minority -0.03 (0.01)* 
State-Level Control Variables  
Unemployment 0.0008 (0.0005) 
Income 0.000001 (0.0000004)** 
Tax -0.0000008 (0.000002) 
Note. N = 2,452 observations; 482 institutions; 50 states 
***p ≤ .001; **p ≤ .01; *p ≤ .05 
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Table 16: Full Model HLM Analysis for Dependent Variable Retention: Slopes and 
Standard Errors 
 Coefficient (Std. Error) 
Intercept .15 (.07) 
Independent Variables  
Amount -0.0000019 (0.0000015) 
Duration .0006 (.001) 
Institution-Level Variables  
Pell -.00002 (0.000008)* 
Carnegie_Research .06 (.01)*** 
Carnegie_Masters .03 (.01)** 
SATMATH75 .0006 (.0001)*** 
Tuition 0.000004 (0.000002)* 
Faculty .10 (.37) 
Minority .02 (.02) 
State-Level Variables  
Unemployment .005 (.001)*** 
Income 0.000003 (0.0000009)*** 
Tax 0.0000015 (0.000004) 
Note. N = 2,452 observations; 482 institutions; 50 states 
***p ≤ .001; **p ≤ .01; *p ≤ .05 
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APPENDIX B: 
Figures 1-2 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of Average Completion Rates in Percent Per Year in Performance 
Funding vs. Non-Performance Funding States 
 
 
Note. Data compiled from IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database (NCES 2013a). 
 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of Average Retention Rates in Percent Per Year in Performance 
Funding vs. Non-Performance Funding States 
 
 
Note. Data compiled from IPEDS: Delta Cost Project Database (NCES 2013a).  
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